Dabiski, viss nebūs tieši tāpat, kā tas kaimiņvalstī notika pēc 1998.gada 17.augusta, kad tika pasludināta valsts maksātnespēja jeb defolts. Dolāra vērtība pret rubli uzlēca turpat seškārt. Zīmīgi, ka toreiz, tāpat kā tagad, valdība apgalvoja, ka viss ir kārtībā un nav jāļaujas paniskiem noskaņojumiem. Krievijas ekonomikai bija vajadzīgi pāris gadi, lai atkoptos. Skan mazliet paradoksāli, taču to veicināja arī fakts, ka par premjeru pēc defolta kļuva Jevgeņijs Primakovs, uz ārpolitisko darbību orientēts cilvēks, kas par ekonomiku īpaši nelikās zinis.
American democracy is malfunctioning to the detriment of our foreign-policy decision making. The hysterical and one-sided U.S. media coverage of the August war between Russia and Georgia is just the most recent example. Watching the way the American political class sometimes discusses international affairs, it is hard not to wonder to what extent we are capable of responsible judgments, or for that matter, even rational dialogue. In this particular case it could lead to the further disintegration of U.S.-Russia ties; in the longer term, our foreign-policy malfunctions could have far more catastrophic consequences.
Russia no longer disguises the fact that it wants to recover its sphere of influence. The paradox is that Russia can only achieve this through the use of force, as the model of development it proposes is unattractive to east European societies. And the more Russia resorts to force, the less the chances that it will achieve its sphere of influence.
On a chill Friday night in October with seconds left to play in the most anticipated hockey game of a young season, tied three goals apiece, Avangard Omsk, the pride of southwestern Siberia, and Atlant Mytishchi, an upstart from the Moscow suburbs, have players from seven countries on the ice - young men whose hometowns stretch from Canada to Kazakhstan. This is professional hockey in Russia now, at its best.
The nations with the world's three biggest reserves of natural gas - Russia, Iran, and Qatar - are quietly moving ahead to form a "gas OPEC," an organization modeled after the oil cartel.
The global economic crisis has brought Britain and Russia closer, Lord Mandelson said yesterday as he talked of a new era of partnership only weeks after Gordon Brown ruled out "business as usual" with the Kremlin.
This past summer's war in Georgia -- and its aftermath -- delivered a higher-voltage shock to U.S.-Russian relations than any event since the end of the Cold War. It made Russia an unexpected flashpoint in the U.S. presidential campaign and probably won Russia a place at the top of the next administration's agenda. Yet this is hardly the first time in the last two decades that Washington has buzzed with discussion of ominous events in Russia. Before long, the buzzing has usually subsided. Will this crisis prove different? Has Washington's thinking about Russia really changed, and how much?
Die ganze Welt grämt sich wegen der Finanzkrise. Fast. Denn auf einem Achtel der Weltoberfläche leisten die Menschen hartnäckig Widerstand und nehmen die Schockwellen aus der Welt des Gelds und der Wirtschaft statt mit Stirnrunzeln und Schlafstörungen mit Humor: die Russen. Als nach den ersten Bankenpleiten auch an den Moskauer Börsen die Kurse fielen, stieg antiproportional die Zahl der Krisen-Witze. „Es gibt eben nur wenige Aktienbesitzer in Russland", redeten westliche Spaßverderber den russischen Sinn fürs Lachen schlecht. Doch die Russen straften die Nörgler lügen: Je stärker ihnen die Krise im Alltag zu schaffen macht, um so mehr machen sie sich über sie lustig.
Call it the coalition of the unwilling. Battered by the financial crisis, countries from Iceland to Hungary to Pakistan are turning to the International Monetary Fund for a loan. Rich countries have banks in need of support; in poor (and even not-so-poor) countries it is the governments that risk going under. Yet even in these desperate straits, few have approached the fund willingly. Its Washington headquarters are often the last port of call; Iceland went to Moscow first, while Pakistan's leaders tried their luck with Beijing, declaring the IMF to be "Plan C". Whoever said that beggars cannot be choosers should have stuck around for the financial crisis of 2008.
The aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war presents the next U.S. president with an early test of American resolve to continue NATO's eastward expansion, a bipartisan policy that dates back to the Clinton administration.