Here we go again. Those reproaching Russia for a lack of politics inside the country, have been, for the umpteenth time, shown how wrong they are: if Russia is a state, it has to be managed, and state management, regardless of the methods it is managed by, is politics. Yet, the critics dig in, and they should be credited for some good logic: it has been a long time since they saw a glossy cover of a true political fight, some high-profile public jockeying for domestic power. And what they do not see doesn't exist, isn't this logical?
But now, there is something happening here, a good fight finally going public. Contrary to expectations, the fight is brewing among the elite close to the government. This could be mildly described as "protective pluralism," but passions are already beginning to run high (ask Gorbachev where this kind of pluralism can lead). So far, the debate is mainly heard among younger people. Older people respond with ambiguity, if at all. Well, we are taking one step at a time.
For example, a harsh public exchange took place shortly before a meeting of the State Council on reform of Russia's political system. One author expressed doubt as to the need for any reform at all and suggested suspending the project for the next 10-12 years while sticking to a system that existed at the end of Putin's tenure as president (2007). However, since it would be impossible to "freeze" without any change for that long, and since lawmakers should be kept busy during that time, let them provide "cosmetic" changes while keeping "the basics" untouched. This idea provoked a harsh response from several authors. One even wrote that we were dealing with more than "an obliging fool," but with an "enemy of modernisation." Although essentially more encouraging than not (God deliver me from fools, the proverb goes suggesting they are more dangerous than enemies), the statement still sounded alarming.
This naturally spurred further debate as more authors joined in, claiming that both were wrong; the bickering grew ardent. The only problem was that anyone who was not part of the argument would have had a hard time making heads or tails of the discussion.
"What do you mean, what's it about?! Modernisation, isn't it?" Hold on a moment. No one has yet explained what we mean by the term. Take, for example, the Presidential Commission on Modernisation and Technology Development, which is working on five specific projects; the proposed "freeze" does not seem to apply to those. Or does it? In that case, could you please explain in what way the commission's activity could be affected? But nothing is being explained directly; we get only vague metaphors instead, like "modernisation engines," and even "hand planes" and "chisels" which need to be used on the "power pillar" to "refine" it, according to one author, or "undermine it" or "tear it down," according to another.
More meaningful proposals, if any, are too general to grasp, and always have a proviso: please do not ask me if this is realistic because I don't know – this is just an idea anyway. Is there at least one specific proposal which would need supporters or have enemies? There is not. So what are we talking about? "But don't you understand?!"
Debates that most people cannot understand are quite frequent. Some of them in fact have nothing important to say anyway.
French Renaissance writer and humanist François Rabelais mentioned a nonexistent book "Can a chimera buzzing in the void devour second intentions? A very tricky issue debated for ten weeks at the council of Constance." Well, the ongoing discussion is obviously of the same quality.
What medieval theologists were fighting for was their rank in the hierarchy; why shouldn't modern political analysts be doing the same? If this is so (or, more precisely, as long as this is so), their debates will be of no interest to the general public. And they are not even fighting for power, but rather for positions close to power. Even so, this explanation is not complete.
When the president delivered his state of the nation address to parliament in November, Gleb Pavlovsky, [president of the Effective Policy Foundation], who is as experienced at public debate as anyone, said it was necessary to identify a range of attitudes toward Medvedev's modernisation strategy. If these attitudes are not identified soon, he said, an open conflict will help: "Those who believe Medvedev's address reached them, should openly admit that his plans are being sabotaged, and point out those who are sabotaging them."
As we can see now, nothing of the kind has happened: an open conflict would have been hard to miss. In fact this was never going to happen, because they are reluctant to speak out loud. But the internal tension is growing, that's why the younger ones lose control.
This is not because of the presidential address; various officials are more than willing to line up and march in whatever direction is indicated, but the problem is, no one is telling them which line will march in the right direction, and they cannot choose.
Last summer, when both Putin and Medvedev said they were not ruling out seeking re-election in 2012, people in the political establishment didn't see any urgency in their statements. But then a simple truth began sinking in, slowly but surely – this decision will have to be made in 2010. It is the way the Russian political system works. They panicked, because it finally dawned on them that we are in 2010 already! This means that the ruling tandem must reach some kind of agreement soon, next month or even next week! At that moment they must compose their features in such a way as to demonstrate that this agreement was exactly what they were waiting for. They must make the right choice right away with no chance to cheat and look up the keys. It's only natural that they panicked, who wouldn't?
Well, the only encouragement that could be given to these respectable people is that their anxiety will end soon – in a few months at best. Alexander Dugin, [founder of the Eurasia Party and ideologist of Russian nationalism], who prefers slamming enemies of "consensus" rather than enemies of "modernisation," wrote: "If the situation remains unchanged till autumn, then those who are trying to destabilize it will only hurt themselves. We are making a list of all those who are inciting Medvedev to rebel against Putin. It will be too late then, there will be no politics in Russia for the next 14 years." It is difficult to argue with this.
As long as rumours of a possible swap of [Rashid] Nurgaliyev for [Sergei] Stepashin and similar "breaking news" make the headlines, nothing will stir the situation till autumn. They won't even have to reform the lines to begin marching.
By Alexander Privalov