Expert's Man of the Year for 2009 is President of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov. We believe that he has launched a new trend in politics in the North Caucasus and, by extension, in the whole country.
The first Chechen War began 15 years ago. Since then, the North Caucasus has been a sore point in Russian politics. For many years, Chechnya under Dudayev and then Maskhadov - especially when Basayev's militants invaded Dagestan - was a constant reminder of the danger of the country's disintegration and the Caucasus was an alternative political pole to Moscow. Terrorism put the issue of security at the top of the agenda that brought to the fore people who, owing to their profession, had to ensure security. Until recently, the main ideological cleavages in society were over what to do about terrorism and what to do about the Caucasus.
Considering the situation in Chechnya at the time Vladimir Putin came to power, tough military methods to combat terrorists were inevitable. But one has to understand that the Kremlin had (and still has) only the civil, military, and security structures then available: long-neglected institutions that were corrupt, ill-disposed to obeying the law, and still less concerned with human rights. Reforming these military and security agencies and limiting their legal and actual powers "on the march," i.e. when in action, was thought to be politically impossible.
Putin came to power on the slogan of fighting terrorism, and this was the area in which he was to prove his credentials as a politician and a leader. (Incidentally, Dmitry Medvedev was never faced with such a challenge). At the end of the day, the stability of the regime and the stability of the country were at stake, and practically any means were necessary.
The last terrorist attack that spelled dire consequences for the Kremlin was the seizure of the school in Beslan. Since then, terrorism ceased to be the top item on the domestic political agenda. The credit for this must go to Vladimir Putin.
However, having chosen security as a priority that came before all else (Russian politicians only discuss the rampant corruption in the North Caucasus in terms of how it influences terrorism), we have been building up and supporting institutions of war in the Caucasus for fifteen years. This indicates that national policy has a strong bias towards the use of force.
The advent of Yunus-bek Yevkurov and his activities as President of Ingushetia lay the cornerstone for institutions of peace.
Days after his inauguration, the President of Ingushetia met with the representatives of the opposition. Some of them later became members of the administration, some continued cooperating with Yevkurov without holding official posts. That move alone dampened the confrontation between the opposition and the authorities that had simmered in Ingushetia for several years and left no hope for any positive change.
(Let us note parenthetically that it may be a good thing that the opposition in Ingushetia proved to be such that one could talk to it. However debatable some of their statements may be, these people have chosen to oppose the authorities not by TNT or the bullet, but by rallies and articles. That paved the way for dialogue.)
Then followed the Congress of the People of Ingushetia, in which Mr. Yevkurov got to approve the draft law on the boundaries of municipal entities. There was considerable opposition in the Republic to that law because it would fix the current borders of the Republic without the Prigorodny District of North Ossetia, from which the Ingush population was evicted in 1992 and which many Ingushis consider to be their land. The President allowed everyone to have his say at the Congress and himself openly declared that he was in favour of the law, thus assuming the political responsibility for dropping territorial claims to the neighbouring republic. As a result, in autumn, Ingushetia held municipal elections that formed local governments. Last week, the presidents of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed an agreement on the return of Ingush refugees to villages in the Prigorodny District. This holds promise that the Ossetia-Ingush conflict, active since 1992, will be settled.
Yevkurov never denied that terrorists should be fought; but he became the first leader in the North Caucasus openly and consistently to oppose violations of the law by its enforcers. Thanks to Yevkurov's efforts, criminal cases have been opened against those who commit such violations. Investigations into kidnappings are being launched, albeit with some difficulty. This is very important for restoring popular trust in the Republic's authorities. The President of Ingushetia, for the first time in the history of the Republic, initiated talks with militants who have decided to lay down their arms. "Exodus from the woods" has not yet become a mass phenomenon. In an autumn interview with Expert, Yevkurov said that fourteen people had returned to civilian life this year. But in contrast to militants in neighbouring Chechnya, these people have guarantees under the law rather than the personal guarantee of the leader. And instead of signing up for the Republic's Interior Ministry and carrying the same rifle, they find civilian jobs.
In a nutshell, instead of relying exclusively on the use of force - which might have been expected from an army officer - Yunus-bek Yevkurov put the stake on dialogue, confidence, and reconciliation. And also on his own moral authority. His integrity is well known in and outside the Republic. And that, given the limited nature of other important political assets, is an essential strength. Moral authority is not such a significant factor in Russian politics. The fact that Yevkurov has conferred it with a new importance has implications far beyond Ingushetia.
Yevkurov commands the strong support of the federal government, as witnessed by the recent decision to allocate Ingushetia an additional 29 billion roubles for the next six years. But experience this year shows how hard it is to achieve real change for the better in the Caucasus - and not only in the Caucasus - even with the simultaneous support of both society and higher governing bodies.
The reason is not only the increased activity of terrorists who see Yevkurov as a political threat and have organized an attempt on his life. Nor can one single out the attempts to disrupt emerging social dialogue in Ingushetia, the most dangerous such attempt being the assassination of human rights activist and politician Maksharip Aushev in October of this year. This week there were two explosions in Ingushetia, one of which seriously injured the widow of Maksharip Aushev. In another explosion, the suicide bomber turned out to be her brother... While the President of Ingushetia was recovering from wounds suffered during the assassination attempt, the court acquitted almost all the officials earlier charged with corruption-a decision that may have much to do with the peculiar position of the Prosecutor's Office and the courts in the Republic, which are independent from the executive branch.
In September, the President of Ingushetia reshuffled the Republic's Government. Explaining the move in an interview with Expert, he said that the officials fulfilled his instructions only if he personally prodded them forward. The new Prime Minister is Alexei Vorobyov, a former security man. Judging from his career path, he is a top-class operative with a fine grasp of economics and a knack for uncovering corruption schemes. He has Yevkurov's trust. If such a person has been appointed to head the republic's government it means that the bureaucracy in Ingushetia is utterly corrupt.
This is not about militants, but about the general state of government institutions and society. Quick results cannot be expected. But this is one of those cases in which the trend is no less important than the practical result.
Whether the trend will be sustained is an open question. Clearly, institutions of peace in the North Caucasus cannot be built through the efforts of the leader of a single republic. Judging from the part of Dmitry Medvedev's presidential address dealing with North Caucasus, even the political language for building such institutions has not yet been developed. So far, everything revolves around words like "the underground bandits" or "the fight against terror" that signify a whole arsenal of wartime vocabulary. Yevkurov needs not only financial support, but also systematic anti-corruption actions by the federal authorities aimed at cleansing the law enforcement system. So far, there have not been enough of such actions. But actual appointment of Yevkurov and the attention Moscow is paying to him indicate that at least part of the political class is aware of the need for change. The President of Ingushetia plays the role of catalyst; and he claims much of the credit for the values of reconciliation and confidence that have acquired ever more currency in national policy.
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People of the year, 2002-2008
2008. The head of the Bank of Russia, Sergey Ignatyev. The crisis, which moved to the top of the national agenda, naturally brought the representatives of the economic elite to the fore. Although the actions of the Central Bank have not always been impeccable, they held back the country from being dragged into the vortex of the financial crisis.
2007. Vladimir Putin, then President of the RF. Putin's qualities as a politician were most vividly manifested during his last year as President: a readiness to take risks, the ability to take the rival unawares by mutually beneficial proposals, a readiness to go it alone - all that in 2007 added up to a strong political drive. That drive, incidentally, caused many to doubt that Putin would relinquish his presidential post. Nevertheless, he has kept his promise not to change the Constitution.
2006. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. His nomination marked Russia's newly active role in international politics. The credit for this of course went not only to the Minister, but also to the Russian foreign policy that for the most part rose to the challenge. The Minister arguably played a key role in these measures. The Minister's direct and active involvement could be interpreted as a sign of the weakness of his subordinates (if rank-and-file Foreign Ministry officials work normally, the Minister does not have to be present in all parts of the world simultaneously). On the other hand, it signaled that foreign policy tasks had become a top national priority.
2005. The men of the year were Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and Chairman of the Gazprom Board of Directors Dmitry Medvedev, who embodied the dramatic increase of state interference in the economy. In June, the state acquired a controlling block of shares in Gazprom. In September, Gazprom acquired Sibneft. The gas giant launched the North European gas pipeline project and the development of the Shtokman field, established links with ENI and broke into the Italian market. Finally, in 2005, Gazprom proceeded to cancel non-market, largely political, discounts on the price of gas for the former republics of the USSR.
2004. Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. He set an example of exercising diplomatic skills in the unlikeliest of places, at least within the established political practice. Non-committal comments that made it impossible to take the Prime Minister up on his word, his distancing himself from the Yukos case and from the parliament "cash-for-benefits" law, were the Prime Minister's visiting cards. Then - and perhaps to this day - nobody could say exactly what function Mikhail Fradkov was serving. He could have just been keeping the seat warm or tacitly putting things in order. One thing is clear: under Fradkov, the authorities did not bother to explain their intentions and actions to the nation. Ritual speeches, for the most part wonderfully correct, had nothing to do with policy that was often not so correct, judging from the results.
2003. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Roman Abramovich. Two different faces of big Russian business. Both divided public opinion, but each in his own way: the former tried to expand the boundaries of the permissible, and the latter made it clear that he would on no account cross these boundaries. The attempt to parlay economic power into political power brought the former to the dock. The latter consciously rejected such a trade-off and remained at the top of the financial Olympus.
2002. The new Krasnoyarsk governor Alexander Khloponin. At the time, he embodied the coming of a new generation into politics, a generation that grew up in post-Soviet Russia. The man's rise from being the head of Norilsky Nikel at 31 to the head of a difficult Siberian region at 37 was truly meteoric.