Few countries have been as hard-hit by the global financial crisis as Russia. The Russian stock exchange has lost 70 per cent of its value since May. But the effect on Russia's main companies has been dramatically magnified by the huge borrowings of the oligarchs, the men who bought controlling shares in Russia's industries during the flawed post-communist privatisations of the 1990s. Many of these moguls borrowed heavily against the rising value of their shares, and have lost billions in paper fortunes. As a result they are facing huge margin calls, and have to repay or refinance $120 billion before the end of next year. There is only one source rich enough to save them - the State. Could Russia's lurch into the wilder shores of capitalism end as suddenly as it began, with the reintegration of key industries under state control?
The Russian Government has offered up to $50 billion to tide them over, but some oligarchs have such large debts that a firesale looks inevitable. Oleg Deripaska, Russia's richest man whose fortune is estimated at $28 billion, may have to apply for state refinancing: he has to repay to Western banks some $2 billion of a $4.5 billion loan by November. The owner of a majority holding in the Rusal aluminium company, he also has large stakes in Western car and construction companies. Some of these interests have already been sold; others will have to go. Speculation is also swirling around companies such as Vladimir Yevtushenkov's Sistema and Mikhail Fridman's Alfa Group, whose troubles have already led to lay-offs at Alfa Bank. Others who have indicated that they would apply for loans include Lukoil, the second-largest oil firm, one of Russia's largest steelmakers and its second-largest bank.
What is unclear is whether the Kremlin will exploit the oligarchs' woes to take back control of strategic industries and energy companies. It is certainly in a position to do so: Russia now has $140 billion in reserves, having salted away the profits from its oil exports for the past decade.
Vladimir Putin is probably not looking at renationalisation. He has never shown the slightest interest in a return to communism, and is too shrewd to let outdated ideology return through the back door. He is determined, however, to keep Russian industry in Russian hands - and therefore will not allow foreign carpetbaggers to buy up the shares at bargain prices.
Whose will be these hands? For a while, the State may become a majority shareholder. But temporary nationalisation gives Mr Putin, who has often shown adroitness in turning misfortune to his advantage, an extraordinary opportunity. Any move that appears to remove power and assets from the oligarchs will be wildly popular with voters, who deeply resent this clique of the super-rich. But when the economy and the stock market recover, the assets can again be privatised, at a large profit to the Kremlin and those loyalists who have taken temporary charge. And the oligarchs who have been rescued will remain for ever in Mr Putin's debt and under his control.
There is one immediate setback - the Sochi Winter Olympics, closely linked to Mr Putin's own prestige, which will depend on the oligarchs for finance. But with all the political levers in his hands, the wily Prime Minister can probably still force out the funding needed while ensuring that the rest of Russia rides out the current storm.