The Wall Street Journal (USA): "Getting Moscow to Behave"
When European Union leaders meet in Brussels tomorrow and Thursday, an important action item on their agenda is Russia -- specifically how to react to its continuing occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow has more troops in those breakaway regions than before the August war with Georgia.
Steering Russian policy back toward internationally accepted norms -- and getting Russian troops out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- will require a carefully calibrated transatlantic effort. But as a first step, there are actions the EU could take on its own -- starting with a decision at this week's meeting not to restart talks with Moscow over the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which would provide for expanded trade relations.
Trying to alter Russian behavior may bring few results in the short term. But the U.S. and Europe should not delay this effort in the hope that the current global financial crisis will make Russia see the wisdom of cooperation. Moscow already is blaming the West for the country's current economic woes, and there's a risk that ordinary citizens could become even more nationalistic than they already are -- and more supportive of a confrontational foreign policy. Some oligarchs may urge cooperation with the West, but they have little political influence.
Throughout the Georgia crisis, Washington has been careful to stay close to its European allies. The EU effort led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy has not achieved all that was hoped. But the U.S. is unlikely to have done better on its own and may have done worse. As U.S. policy makers -- now and in the next administration -- refocus Russia policy, this cooperation between the U.S. and the EU needs to deepen.
Economic leverage can be applied immediately by insisting that Gazprom and other Russian companies investing in the West abide by all existing regulations, including on transparency, corporate governance and competition policy. Some governments, especially in Central Europe, have been too tolerant of the lax and sometimes corrupt business practices of Russian corporations and their domestic partners.
Russian investment in some sectors of the Western economy, including energy, should be reviewed for security implications. The visas of Russian executives whose companies persist in corrupt practices or trade in South Ossetia or Abkhazia should be denied. Such measures will create more pressure on Moscow than further delays in admission to the World Trade Organization, which is not popular in Russian business circles anyway.
The U.S. cannot do this alone. The EU is responsible for 55% of Russian trade and 75% of foreign direct investment in the country. The comparable numbers for the U.S. are only 6% and 4% respectively.
Reducing Russia's leverage over Europe is essential. Countries dependent on Russian energy supplies need to seek alternative sources. Recent EU talks with Nigeria about a trans-Sahara gas pipeline are a step forward, but the EU also needs to build the gas storage facilities and pipelines that allow emergency sharing of gas with member states that are particularly dependent on Russian supplies.
The U.S. and the EU need to be ready to help Ukraine -- and perhaps even Belarus -- to cope if Russia suddenly raises their energy prices to world levels; it could do so by encouraging a gradual price rise and providing a temporary subsidy if needed. The EU should also liberalize its domestic energy market with a reciprocity clause that will prevent Russian firms from purchasing vulnerable assets unless Western companies are also free to invest equally in Russia.
As Russia seeks to expand its sphere of influence, the EU, and to a lesser extent the U.S., can offer Russia's neighbors an alternative road to prosperity and pluralism. In the wake of the Georgia conflict, the EU has already enhanced ties with Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Belarus. While both Georgia and Ukraine should be supported in moving toward NATO membership, the EU and the U.S. may be more effective in stabilizing the region in the short term through free trade agreements, easing visa restrictions, and assistance aimed at creating closer economic and civil society ties.
Some Western policy makers have resisted pressuring Russia because Moscow's cooperation is considered vital in restraining Iran's nuclear program, encouraging stability in the Balkans, and countering global terrorism. It is time for a serious review of these assumptions.
Stability in Afghanistan and defeating terrorism are directly in Russia's self-interest, and Moscow can be expected to cooperate with the West -- even NATO -- to achieve these aims. It is less clear whether Russia is genuinely committed to finding a solution on Iran. The Russian leadership still seems to value G-8 membership, but if Russian troops continue to violate the Georgia cease-fire, it must be asked whether a G-8 summit in mid-2009 would be constructive.
Arms control may provide another form of leverage. When the U.S. abandoned the ABM treaty in 2001 -- a mainstay of cold war arms control that limited missile defense -- a dismayed Russia later left the treaty that placed limits on conventional arms in Europe. Instead of continuing this downward spiral, Washington should push for a renewal of the START agreement, which has enforced verifiable limits on nuclear weapons since 1994.
The alternative could be an expensive arms race that Russia's economy can ill afford. Implementing the U.S.-Russia accord on peaceful nuclear cooperation -- which was recently withdrawn from congressional consideration -- would make it possible for U.S. firms to sell nuclear materials and technology to Russia. Moscow's threat to leave the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) treaty because of the proposed U.S. missile defense site in Central Europe requires a serious response from Washington. The new U.S. administration could do worse than trying to engage Russia to see if some tweaks to the treaty or the proposed missile defense site could save the INF accord.
Managing a calibrated strategy of many different levers will require close U.S.-EU coordination, and a willingness to play good cop, bad cop. Many U.S. policy makers will be skeptical that this can be managed with the Europeans, who are often divided in their approach to Russia. But Georgia has shaken European complacency and there is a new determination to act together. For their part, many Europeans are skeptical of working with the U.S., especially during the last three months of the Bush administration. They resent a perceived U.S. indifference to Europe's geographical proximity to Russia and energy dependence.
Despite this mutual skepticism, the U.S. and its European partners must work closely together -- only such a coordinated application of carrots and sticks has a chance of guiding Russia back toward the international community.
