The Financial Times: «Mixed messages revive art of Kremlinology»
It is ever harder to tell when a Russian leader is on message, off message, or even if there is a message. On a host of issues such as Iran sanctions, US missile defence and entry to the World Trade Organisation, there is a growing perception that the Kremlin either can't make up its mind or is playing an elaborate game of pretending that it can't.
After four months of apparent dithering, the Kremlin last week seemed to have reversed its position for a second time on a policy of trying to enter the WTO as a collective trade bloc with Kazakhstan and Belarus, saying it would apply independently.
Russia's attitude to western sanctions on Iran, meanwhile, is especially hard to fathom. China, which opposes sanctions, and the US, which supports them, seem to be under the impression that Russia supports their view.
In semantic terms, the positions of Dmitry Medvedev, the president, Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, and Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, are basically the same but differences of emphasis make Russia's line difficult to grasp.
All seem to say sanctions are a possible last resort: Mr Medvedev opposes sanctions but said last month they could be used in extremis . Mr Lavrov declared sanctions "unproductive" but added last week that they could be unavoidable in some cases. On Wednesday Mr Putin said talk of sanctions was "premature" in what was seen as a rebuke to Mr Medevdev.
Whether this amounts to a different opinion is unclear. One diplomat thought the disagreements were choreographed; another called the Medvedev-Putin routine "good cop, bad cop" while another said it resembled a "Punch and Judy" show.
So do the different messages reflect the two mens' different approaches?
Mr Putin is nationalistic and statist and Mr Medvedev more western-oriented but both routinely blur the boundaries of the constitutional division of labour between them. Mr Medvedev summons ministers and publicly gives them instructions on the economy, which is Mr Putin's job, while Mr Putin makes foreign policy, which is Mr Medvedev's.
"Between them, it is difficult to be certain what behaviour and statements to ascribe to a good cop/bad cop routine to personal ambitions or to real policy differences" write Dimitri Simes and Paul J. Saunders in an article to be published in National Interest journal.
The WTO application seems to have been one case of clear disagreement The attempt to join the trade bloc was on track to be completed this year. But in June, Mr Putin said Russia would withdraw its application and seek to join with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Judging by their stunned reactions, Mr Medvedev and most senior officials were taken aback.
Then, Mr Medvedev said separate entry would be "simpler". Maksim Medvedkov, the chief WTO negotiator, confirmed on Thursday that Russia would seek entry independently of its customs union partners, though their applications would be "synchronised" a word left purposefully vague.
If this policy sticks, it would mark a significant setback for Mr Putin, the first time he has failed to prevail in a issue of this magnitude.
Elsewhere, there seems to be a split between hardliners and liberals within the Kremlin. When Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's ambassador to Nato, said last month that a new US missile defence plan represented a threat to Russia, a Kremlin "source" was quoted disowning the comments. That appeared to lend more weight to the notion of a rift. Kremlinology has never been an exact science but it has rarely yielded such diverging results.
By Charles Clover
