Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's political legacy is inextricably linked to that of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, in ways that go beyond mere political lineage.
After then-President Putin endorsed Medvedev to succeed him in December 2007, Medvedev announced his intention, if elected, to name Putin as prime minister. With their slogan, "Together we will win," the two reassured voters that they would continue the popular policies of Putin's presidency. With the backing of Putin and his allies, and with the government restricting the activities of opposition candidates, Medvedev easily won the March 2008 presidential elections with more than 70 percent of the vote. But while his close ties with Putin guaranteed his election, they have also made it difficult for Medvedev to overcome perceptions that he remains little more than Putin's poodle.
Some Russian and Western analysts expected that Medvedev's background in private business and his liberal reputation -- he never joined the Communist Party, or served in the military or intelligence services -- would lead him to roll back some of Putin's authoritarian measures. Such "thaws" were not uncommon in the Soviet era after a change in leadership. Certain observers even thought that Putin had chosen Medvedev as his successor precisely in order to reduce tensions with the West and to take responsibility for moderating some of Putin's earlier decisions.
During his campaign and subsequent year in office, Medvedev has indeed publicly called for greater freedoms, for less corruption, and for greater respect for the rule of law. But despite some high-profile initiatives to promote these objectives, no comprehensive reversal of Russia's quasi-authoritarian political system has taken place.
In a major campaign speech in February 2008, Medvedev framed his domestic reform agenda under the rubric of pursuing "the four I's": institutions, infrastructure, innovation and investment. His specific proposals included:
- expanding social development programs;
- curbing bureaucratic red tape as well as other government inefficiencies and infringements on the private sector;
- making the ruble an international reserve currency;
- starting a national innovation system;
- strengthening the independence of the judicial system;
- and modernizing Russia's transport and energy infrastructure.
During his first state of the union address in November 2008, Medvedev called for lengthening the term in office of future Russian presidents from four to six years, and future legislators from four to five years. The resulting constitutional amendment was speedily pushed through the Duma and ratified by regional parliaments. Medvedev also called for changes in the electoral laws to ensure the representation of smaller parties and enhance the authority of local governments. These changes have been slower in coming.
Finally, in this and other speeches, Medvedev denounced excessive government interference in the market and encroachments against people's civil rights, warning of the dangers of an all-powerful bureaucracy. Public opinion surveys find that most Russians, while deeming Medvedev's reform efforts sincere, fail to see any noticeable progress during the past year toward their realization.
More generally, the changes that have occurred in Russian politics during the last year are primarily those of style rather than substance. Medvedev is shorter, younger, and generally less threatening in stature and discourse than Putin. Whereas Putin regularly resorts to street slang and gutter language when referring to his domestic and foreign critics, Medvedev's rhetoric is embedded with legal terms and reasoning. The intimidating nationalist -- critics would say fascist -- youth groups that gained prominence during the last years of the Putin presidency have adopted a much lower profile under Medvedev.
In contrast to his secretive predecessor, moreover, Medvedev has increased presidential transparency by posting travel logs and other musings on the Internet, reporting his household income and property -- and requiring other senior Russian officials to do likewise, though without providing a means of verification -- and by conducting interviews with liberal newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta, several of whose journalists were killed in still unresolved murder cases. These gestures, while innovative, seem to reflect a Russian political tradition in which people strive to circumvent the bureaucrats and courtiers surrounding the leader and appeal directly to "the good czar."
Nevertheless, the recent elections for mayor in Sochi, in which the pro-government candidate won a campaign characterized by abuses, demonstrated that the Kremlin continues to encounter no difficulty in securing political victories for its favorite candidates. The state also retains control over the commanding heights of the Russian economy as well as the Russian broadcast media. Amnesty International marked Medvedev's anniversary as president by issuing a scathing report that found little improvement in Russians' civil rights, despite the change of power in the Kremlin.
The August 2008 war with Georgia led Medvedev to shelve much of his domestic reform agenda to instead burnish his national security credentials. He joined Putin in accusing the Georgian government of Mikheil Saakashvili of committing genocide and war crimes against Russian citizens in South Ossetia. He has also attacked Saakashvili's Western allies for seeking to bring Georgia into NATO. Medvedev has stressed his commitment to sustain Russian military power despite the global financial crisis, which has hit Russia especially hard due to the concurrent collapse of world energy prices.
Observers constantly discuss the extent to which Medvedev is trying, if at all, to distance himself from Putin. Medvedev has yet to break with any of the foreign policy initiatives he inherited from Putin. He has criticized some of Putin's domestic policies, though never attacked his predecessor by name.
Some analysts see Medvedev as trying to introduce genuine reforms but lacking the power to do so. The president is surrounded by many officials, aides and -- reportedly -- bodyguards appointed by, and presumably loyal to, Putin. In addition, Medvedev lacks any formal role in the ruling United Russia Party, which Putin heads. Although opinion surveys show that Medvedev enjoys broad popular support, if somewhat less then Putin, Medvedev lacks any particular support base, beyond perhaps the legal profession. Putin still enjoys the allegiance of the dominant political, business, and security elites that wield real political power in contemporary Russia.
Both men currently face the challenge of governing in the midst of a worldwide recession that, according to the latest data, has dealt the Russian economy a severe blow, perhaps more so than any other major emerging economy. As in 1998, Russia has proven exceptionally vulnerable to a global economic crisis. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 6 percent fall in Russia's GPD in 2009. The official unemployment rate is now approaching 10 percent. Russia also suffers from other problems, including high levels of unused industrial production capacity, instabilities in the Russian financial sector, one of the world's worst-performing stock markets in 2008, and high levels of corporate debt. In addition, the fall in value of the Russian ruble -- especially against the U.S. dollar -- could increase inflation still further by making foreign imports more expensive. The credit squeeze caused by the inability or unwillingness of Russian banks to continue lending large sums to Russian businesses has seen a worrisome revival of the non-payment crises that led to widespread wage arrears under Yeltsin.
Thus far, the financial crisis has not provoked widespread popular discontent. Protests have remained restricted to a few localities, such as Vladivostok, and have been easily dispersed by the security forces. Yet, the emergency will exacerbate an underlying vulnerability of the current Russian political system: the uncertain distribution of power between Russia's two major political leaders, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin.
In one scenario, commonly subscribed to in Western countries, Medvedev will suffer most from Russia's current economic malaise, because he was unlucky to assume the presidency precisely when the global economic crisis brought an end to the long period of economic growth and prosperity that Russia enjoyed under his predecessor. In this case, Putin might replace him, with widespread popular backing among Russians hoping to see a return to the benign economic conditions that marked his two presidential terms. Under the Russian constitution, if Medvedev were to resign or be removed from office before his term expired, the prime minister would become acting president. Putin could then be elected to another two full terms as president.
In another plausible scenario, however, Medvedev might succeed in shifting blame for Russia's poor economic performance to Putin. The tradition in the Russian Federation of holding the prime minister responsible for economic setbacks was already established by President Boris Yeltsin, who dismissed many prime ministers by citing their economic failings. In the case of Putin, moreover, many Russians believe that he has continued to dominate Russian decision making despite the formal presidential transition.
At the moment, the Russian political elite is seeking to blame the U.S. for Russia's economic problems. At the same time, the government-influenced media is limiting its coverage of Russia's economic difficulties, and instead highlighting government efforts to spur economic growth. This strategy conveniently absolves both the heads of the Russian government and the country's major economic institutions and businesses of responsibility for the slowdown.
But should these techniques lose their persuasiveness, then the current system of dual power in Moscow could, as in previous decades, lead to vicious infighting. In that case, the question that has dominated both Russian and Soviet politics, "kto-kogo," could well resurface. Meaning literally "who-whom," it refers to who controls whom -- or who does what to whom. For the time being, the answer to that question -- which will determine Medvedev's political future -- is not yet clear.
Richard Weitz is a Hudson Institute senior fellow and a World Politics Review senior editor. His column, Global Insights, appears in WPR every Tuesday.
Photo: President Dmitry Medvedev at the World Economic Forum prior to his presidency, Davos, Switzerland, 2007 (WEF photo licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 2.0 License).
Richard Weitz