By Ian Bremmer
The world enters 2009 with Russia in play in a way it hasn't seen in decades. The relevant comparison isn't 1998, when the Russians engaged in default and devaluation but remained within the bounds of their existing political and economic system (as Lenin said, two steps forward, one step back). The history to consider is 1989--as key aspects of the Russian system could change for the worse.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin certainly isn't a risk taker. The carefully managed "transition" to President Dmitry Medvedev and the extension of presidential terms to six years underscore that Putin prefers to leave as little as possible to chance. That's more ominously obvious in the recent tightening of laws on treason.
With oil prices well below what the Russians can afford, but Putin's (& Medvedev's) popularity still high, the initial moves have been to consolidate power. Yet despite no organized political opposition to speak of, we're still starting to see social unrest. For the first time in years, there have been widespread demonstrations in Russia--in 30 cities, following the imposition of import duties on used cars. We're likely to see much more turbulence in 2009, as factories providing employment for entire cities are shuttered. That's a sort of suffering that Russians are certainly used to, but only in the context of a very different kind of political system.
Where could this go? There will be near-zero state tolerance for dissent. And the strongest level of anti-Americanism (and, in many quarters, of broader xenophobia) of any significant emerging market in the world, creates the potential to make security a serious concern--and possibly lead to unrest that disrupts supply chains. The Obama administration is unlikely to quietly tolerate a crackdown, and will put plenty of focus on human rights and democracy. So American and some European nations' relations with Russia will continue to deteriorate over the course of 2009 (with the Germans, who are more dependent on the Russians economically and, to some extent, politically, playing the role of wild card).
Support within the Kremlin for better relations with the west will also diminish. The real question is how far that actually goes. So does Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin remain strong, get scapegoated, or actually get fired? Are western-leaning oligarchs brought under tighter scrutiny and economic control...or forced out completely? And, most fundamentally, to what degree are the Russians prepared to go back to soviet-style authoritarianism? At worst, it's conceivable that western organizations of all sorts (media, NGOs, and corporates) will be, to varying degrees, seen as increasingly unwelcome within the country.
I don't expect such serious risks on the foreign-policy side. Russia has achieved its principal objectives in Georgia, at least for now, and we'll see less direct conflict over NATO enlargement and missile defense as the west takes a breath and reassesses both issues. Nor will we see Russian tanks in Ukraine. The Russians are too connected into the Ukrainian economy and have too much to lose (though Russian minorities in Ukraine--a majority in Crimea--could see some violence and make headlines. More on that later.) Nevertheless, Russia will be a troublemaker in international relations--if a more unpredictable and opportunistic one than in 2008. As the latest gas cutoff to Ukraine shows, the Kremlin puts realpolitik and national interests first. "market discipline" in the aftermath of Georgia did not prevent Moscow from again turning off the tap to Ukraine, and more instances of bare-knuckles foreign policy are likely in 2009.
