Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is exceptional, if only because he has remained a major factor in Russian politics for the ten years since his election as president. From a top manager hired by the nation, he became a national leader by the middle of his second presidential term. He still retains this status, which does not require any formalisation because it hinges on unprecedented trust. During these ten years, Putin has met three public requirements – order, stabilisation and development.
Putin's departure was accompanied by a militant invasion of Dagestan, terror acts in Moscow, a looming financial bankruptcy and an explosive social situation. In the 2000s, he carried out his policy of pacification and resource concentration in a favourable foreign economic environment. However, its disappearance and a sharp turn for the worse on world markets did not paralyse the government or eclipse the Putin factor.
Putin is a real conservative. After all, the gist of conservatism is not to "conserve," but rather to find and articulate ideas and values that would make it possible to preserve society, not only in general, but under any circumstances. It also lies in the ability "to do" and not just to show what needs to be done in the near future.
Numerous and diverse, long- and short-term decisions on overcoming the crisis had to develop an integral course, but it was vital to prioritise them. It was Putin who managed to formulate the consolidated anti-crisis message of the ruling elite that embraced the positions of high executives, the government, parliament, the regional administration and United Russia.
Upon Putin's initiative, and under his tough control, the government drafted an anti-crisis programme. As a result of its implementation, the social consequences of the crisis were incomparably smaller than those in 1991 or 1998. The observance of public commitments and domestic demand promotion moved to the top of the list of priorities. Most importantly, for the first time in many years, the government's anti-crisis programme looked like a political manifesto (seven priorities), with clearly defined directions of work and a detailed cost sheet.
The crisis is clearly fading, but it is still visible in the social sphere. In the public's eyes, Putin is the winner and, in fact, this is so in reality.
The emergence of the public requirement for development coincided with the 2007-2008 electoral cycle and the start of the crisis. This requirement is difficult as such. However, coupled with the crisis, it became virtually impossible because it was also necessary to ensure the institutional continuity of power and elaborate effective anti-crisis measures at the same time. This could have become a point of no return. If Putin had failed to meet the requirement for development, he would have been doomed to retire from Russian politics.
But Putin offered a systemic answer. He announced a course of modernisation, formulated the Strategy-2020's chief provisions and led efforts to overcome the crisis. Finally, his main answer to the requirement is called "Dmitry Medvedev."
Putin formulated the course for modernisation at an extended session of the State Council in early 2008. The goals he set – to switch the economy from reliance on raw materials to innovation, and to change the country's role in the world, making 50% to 60% of the population middle class – remain topical. It was Putin who moved economic, social and political modernisation to the top of the agenda.
President Dmitry Medvedev developed and specified this course. His article titled, "Russia, Go!," became a manifesto of modernisation, and his recent address to the Federal Assembly became its roadmap. The ruling tandem of the prime minister and the president became a unique system that proved its efficiency in various situations.
In the post-modern era, a political image cannot be sacral. The image must change continuously to correspond with the public expectations at any given moment. A prominent French political scientist once said about Charles de Gaulle: "Loyal to tradition, he was permanently renewing it all, primarily his own style and political views." Putin is very much the same.
He is always interested in public opinion and broadly adjusts his image and political style – and even the content of his policy, depending on public views.
Putin's susceptibility to public attitudes helped to reverse a negative trend in his ratings. The prime minister feels the sentiments of the majority better than anyone else. He always heeds the majority and pushes policy in its interests. This is why he remains the natural leader of the majority, that is, the national leader.
Putin's plan is primarily a political project initiated by United Russia. He has stated this himself. However, with time, the project acquired flesh and blood. Moreover, Russia continues to develop in line with the concepts of Putin's plan.
Such is the national model of democracy, plus an accent on additional guarantees to the minority. Such is a party-and-a-half system, plus an accent on the ruling party's modernisation and the growth of political competition. Such is a stake on major corporations, plus an accent on the importance of their effectiveness. Such is the economy of innovations, plus an accent on the formation of real innovative centres. Such is the struggle against corruption, plus an accent on stronger control of the bureaucracy and the Interior Ministry's reform.
A cycle of eight interregional conferences will start in Krasnoyarsk in late March. Putin is expected to speak. United Russia has found an original technology for mobilising the ruling elite and the population around the national leader.
This mobilisation is by no means oriented toward the elections, although it will facilitate a victory. Only Putin can turn his majority into a majority of modernisation. To be more precise, it can only evolve in this way together with Putin. This is a serious long-term goal, but Putin has proved more than once that his "horizon of planning" is broad. In any event, it embraces both 2011 and 2012.
Dmitry Orlov
