Who leads the Putin-Medvedev tandem? We have long to wait before we see.
Russia has a new national political sport. Before December, we played who's-next. Now, it is the no less exciting who's-boss.
As Western analysts appraised the first week of Medvedev's presidency, they unanimously gave Prime Minister Putin the unofficial title of Bigger Wheel. British newsmen calculated the total length of Medvedev's public addresses. It was an unassuming 18 minutes-much shorter than Putin's single speech at the State Duma. Foreign journalists giggled as Medvedev, in an apparent display of self-obliteration, did not take the boss' chair during his first meeting as president with Putin the prime minister.
But he who laughs last laughs longest. Russian political chess players are still in the opening moves of a new game, whose outcome cannot be predicted today. One thing is clear-it will be a long and entangled game, and it will not be played in public.
The latest appointments to the Presidential Executive Office appear to support the assumption that the new prime minister's allies are besieging Medvedev. Of all the new Kremlin functionaries, only presidential press secretary Natalya Timakova, whose appointment may be announced at any moment, belongs to Medvedev's close circle. A talented journalist, she has worked for many outlets, Moskovsky Komsomolets among them. She headed Putin's press service until quite recently. Timakova has worked closely with Medvedev for a long time, and he has a great deal of respect for her.
As for Alexei Gromov, chief Kremlin media supervisor, who has now been appointed deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Executive Office, he was regarded for several years as one of the officials closest to Putin. Also of interest is the history of Medvedev's relations with Vladislav Surkov, the new first deputy chief of staff. According to rumours (possibly circulated by his enemies), he did not support Medvedev in last year's presidential race. Alexander Beglov, another deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Executive Office, also has a reputation as Putin's man. Sergei Naryshkin, the office chief, is said to be neutral. As for the Government and law enforcement agencies, they abound with Putin's placemen-from which many conclude that President Medvedev is a general without an army, while Putin still holds the field-marshal's baton.
It is certainly too early to make forecasts now. Besides, underestimating new presidents in their first days and weeks in office has become a Russian political custom.
Alexander Voloshin, then head of the Presidential Executive Office, edited Putin's autobiography First Person soon after Yeltsin announced Putin his successor. "Has Mr Putin seen your amendments?" one of his co-authors asked him. "What has Putin to do with it?" was the reply.
At that time, seasoned Kremlin officials regarded Igor Sechin as a harmless eccentric, while influential political commentators assumed that Puin had no crew of his own-much to their readers' amusement. But then, the present situation is unprecedented and defies comparison with 2000 or any other time in Russian or foreign history. Analogies with "Granddad" Kalinin and "President" Podgorny work only in simple minds. The Soviet era did not know anything like the present-day Russian presidency with its vast powers-in particular, that of Commander-in-Chief. Besides, Soviet leadership was collective, and both law and practice placed supreme authority not in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (parliament), but in quite a different place.
Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev will start everything from scratch, and both have equal chances for actual leadership.
Everyone sees Putin's trumps-political inertia, popularity in the country, and a strong crew that has taken all key posts.
Medvedev has no such crew-or so it appears. But he, too, has his trumps. Politicians easily change their stripes. Putin's man could become Medvedev's overnight. In Russia as elsewhere, there is only one thing politicians reckon with. That is strength-and Medvedev can easily gain strength, with his huge constitutional powers.
Who will play first fiddle much depends on the aura of power. This is a phenomenon too irrational for an explicit definition. Still, it is perfectly tangible. Luzhkov's and Primakov's aura was amazingly strong in the summer of 1999-but a subtle, almost unnoticeable shift came, and Putin took over the aura. Will it go with him to the White House, or stay with the new President in the Kremlin? This is the crucial question for today. The answer is not blowing in the wind. We shall wait a long time for it. There was an unwritten law during Putin's presidency and before it-he who makes political clashes public loses, sooner or later. Suffice to recall Viktor Cherkesov, the former anti-drug service chief who tried to start a public discussion of "Chek-ism". Instead of the post of FSB director he sought, he landed a job well away from the corridors of power, though it is a honourable and possibly lucrative position.
Whether this is a post-Putin era or it remains Putin's, secrecy will surely become an even more valued political virtue than before. We may never learn about most of the intrigues, about severed and newly formed alliances, etc. Russian destinies will be settled in villas and private studies, not city squares and conference halls. Russian politics have always been Byzantine. But 2008 might outstrip 1999 and any other year for Byzantine intrigue.
Author: Mikhail Rostovsky