In recent months, a series of disasters has prompted the Russian government to a relatively novel policy shift, and the question of the day is: should one target the bureaucrats rather than the businesses? The answer, for the time being, appears to be yes. But if so, does it mark the beginning of a new "elite revolution"?
The administrative tsunami that swept up the owners of clubs and cafes in the wake of the fire in Perm has reached the top echelons of power, and this time, it may not only touch regional scapegoats (as has already happened in Perm, where leading government officials have resigned), but also Moscow bosses, including some high-ranking government officials. Perhaps for the first time in the last eight years, Russia is on the brink of a major government shakeup.
TARGETING THE TOP
"That the owners and those who arranged the show are irresponsible rascals is clear. But we should look at the role of government structures, including at the federal level. If they issue prescriptions and these prescriptions are ignored, then... they are simply not fit for their jobs," President Dmitry Medvedev declared. The Prime Minister spoke in virtually the same terms.
Moreover, that strong rhetoric was backed by administrative action. The picture that emerged was hardly typical. A pull at one thread led to a tangle of bureaucratic sloppiness reaching all the way up to the federal level. It looks as if the list of those taken to task, terminated, or suspended will grow. Also very significantly, many of the culprits responsible for the Perm tragedy were in the authorities' good books and even regarded as "foremost professionals in their field." The crusade for fire safety went hand-in-hand with the crusade for making prison conditions more humane. After lawyer Sergey Magnitsky died in pretrial detention, there were some high-profile sackings in the Federal Penal Enforcement Service (FSIN). Last Friday, Anatoly Bagmet, the head of the Investigative Department of the Prosecutor General's Office for the city of Moscow was fired "for violating the Prosecutor's Oath."
The top is under heavy fire. The massacre of supermarket customers staged by Major Yevsyukov led to the replacement of all top police bosses in Moscow. An explosion at Arsenal 31 in Ulyanovsk cost four Defence Ministry generals their jobs. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power Station may trigger more high-profile terminations as soon as the findings of the investigation into the accident are published. It has been a long time since the federal authorities censured themselves so severely. The question is: are these one-off actions, or is there more to it than meets the eye? Experts approached by Itogy believe that we are witnessing the systemic fault of the whole vertical power structure, as many at the top now realize. But how far will this "modernization of the elites" go?
VERTICALLY AND HORIZONTALLY
The vertical power structure built by Vladimir Putin was a response to the threat of the country's disintegration and to some highly destructive terrorist acts. The structure did not change as terrorists staged new attacks and avoidable disasters persisted. The authorities responded to all such challenges by expanding "the rights and freedoms" of the bureaucracy. In the wake of the 2004 Beslan tragedy, Vladimir Putin declared a large-scale reform, canceling elections of governors and introducing Duma elections by party ticket.
At the start of his presidential term, Dmitry Medvedev did even more to strengthen the vertical power structure. About a year ago, the constitution was amended to extend the presidential term to six years and that of the Duma to five years. The head of state said these changes were necessary because the President and the State Duma needed more time to accomplish the difficult tasks facing the nation. One might have expected the vertical power structure to operate still more vigorously. Yet the terrorist attacks continued and sloppy management became still more widespread.
There were no quarrels over the idea of the vertical power structure as such. It had been implemented a hundred percent: the country's leaders had all the control levers in their hands, the economy withstood the crisis, and the concept of "separatism" was dropped from the political vocabulary. Nor does the country have a systemic opposition that threatens its stability. A change of the elite could pass off without a murmur, given a nod from the top.
In short, the political machine is designed to be failsafe. This is what we see when the country's leaders solve the trickiest problems in "manual control" mode. The country perceives their personal contribution to the solution of local problems with hope and gratitude. However, this principle, eulogized in the popular Internet ditty, "Putin goes to Pikalyovo to put things right," cannot be a political cure-all. The country is too large, and the leaders have no time to sort out all the Pikalyovos, Magnitskys, and "Lame Horses." It cannot be otherwise: their tasks are strategic. But, as is becoming apparent, the vertical power structure, unless it is manually controlled, starts taking on a life of its own.
At every level of that structure, exclusive horizontal cliques have taken shape, along with a plethora of Russian oligarchs living according to their own rules. The army of bureaucrats is already many times larger than it was even in the Soviet period, and its corrupt appetites have grown accordingly. This monolithic structure strikes fear into anyone except itself. And up until now, no one could return the favor. Conceived as "the sovereign's eye," the institution of Presidential Plenipotentiary Representatives in the Federal Districts has yet to get off the ground. The administrative reform that put supervisory bodies under executive bodies was largely a failure. The judiciary system is marking time. The presidential personnel pool, created more than a year ago, is languishing in expectation. The bench of standby players is empty. And if so, the bureaucrats have nothing to worry about. The long and short of it is that the renewal of elites has been stalled.
Perhaps the choice of personnel is optimal for the manual control mode. Some time ago, Vladimir Putin warned in his personal column in the magazine The Russian Pioneer against ill-thought-out appointments. His message seemed to be that he had already picked the best candidates and that they had already been assigned to their posts in the civil service. New bureaucrats could prove to be far less effective. It was a case of six of one and half a dozen of the other.
He may have a point, if one assumes that the vertical power structure has not undergone any hidden changes over time. But in reality, that powerful ship has since been covered with such a massive layer of bureaucratic barnacles that it is very hard to determine its real condition.
And there is still another side to the problem. The fire service, the penal enforcement service and much else are, to put it mildly, not very effective. For example, a club can only be shut down through a court procedure, which would seem to be in keeping with the law. But if the fire inspectors don't have enough lawyers to support their court claims-and they rarely do-the result is a standstill. In other words, one shortcoming in the system (for example, the lawmakers) leads to another. This is a typical situation for practically any sphere of government administration and control.
The time has come to give the bureaucrats a taste of their own medicine, and the personnel reshuffles of recent days indicate an intention to realign the vertical power structure and scrape such debris from the ship of state. But it will take some scrubbing.
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ON THE ONE HAND
Personnel Promotion
Director of the Current Political Studies Centre, Alexei Chesnakov, believes that there are not yet sufficient grounds for a large-scale reshuffling of the bureaucratic elite.
Q.: Will the Perm tragedy, the Magnitsky case and so on provide a pretext for the "modernization of the elites?"
A.: Punishment of culprits and, if necessary, appointing new people in their place is inevitable after such tragedies. In former years, the authorities did not always react quickly enough because there was often no reserve pool of personnel. The situation now is different: there is a pool of personnel, competent people who could replace those who do not cope with their duties. After all, both Putin and Medvedev have said more than once that they need effective civil servants and not just people who "keep the seat warm." But I would not describe a normal personnel rotation as the "modernization of elites".
Q.: How far can such rotation go?
A.: As far as is necessary. One should not present one-off episodes as political campaigns. If underperforming officials need to be replaced, it will take place pragmatically, on the strength of facts. I am sure we are not talking about any sort of drive.
Q.: Can the present authorities reinvent themselves?
A.: The authorities are capable of reinventing themselves and they will do it. They always act in this way. It is another question as to whether the scale of such a change goes against the grain. But we cannot make decisions on behalf of the authorities. If you feel that more bureaucrats should be sacked, then join the government and do it. In considering the nightmare in Perm or the Magnitsky case, one will find flagrant examples of bureaucratic inefficiency and incompetence. But it would be stupid to use that as a pretext for replacing the entire staff of the fire service or the penal enforcement system. Only those who do not cope should be replaced.
Q.: United Russia offers its own candidates to help govern the country. Is this party in a position to assume the responsibility for the whole country?
A.: Isn't it already a responsible force, unlike the other parties? By the way, it has never renounced its responsibility. I think the UR will continue to provide candidates for higher office. This is one of the party's tasks as a "career lifter." Having said that, the performance of any civil servant should be judged not by party affiliation but based on their competence.
ON THE OTHER HAND,
Personnel Evolution
The head of the Effective Policy Fund, Gleb Pavlovsky, thinks the modernization of the country must be accompanied with the injection of new blood.
Q.: Will the latest disasters provide an impetus for the "modernization of the elites"?
A.: I hope that this year's catastrophes have changed the Russian President's approach to personnel policy. So far, the pace of change and the ultimate result are unclear.
Q.: Will the authorities crack down on the bureaucracy?
A.: On the one hand, you are asking me about personnel, and on the other, you are raising a problem connected with politics. Politics can go very far without touching upon the personnel issue. For example, Vladimir Putin has totally changed the political atmosphere and even the regime in the country while hardly touching the old elites. Today it is hard to say how important a personnel change will be in Dmitry Medvedev's policy. For example, the whole system of penal enforcement has in fact adopted a new concept. It is undergoing some radical changes. They mark a dramatic departure from the GULAG system of prisons and labour camps. That system was so scandalously out of date that the President's latest measures with regard to it are very welcome. It is another question whether the President will succeed in changing that system. It can be done, but it would require considerable effort and resources. I think that if the policy of the country's modernization succeeds, it will be accompanied by a major personnel reshuffle. But so far, Dmitry Medvedev is not rushing things.
Q.: Can power renew itself?
A.: That is a topic best discussed over vodka and pickled cucumbers. The authorities in Russia do little else but renewing themselves. We live in a country that is very different from what it was twenty years ago. And we keep asking ourselves: will anything change in this country? Remember that we live in Russia. Our authorities change their concept at least once in a generation. The question is whether the change is for the better. The answer depends on society and its ability to formulate its own guiding idea.
I don't think the popular thesis of modernization from the top has much scope. Society itself must decide whether it wants to get rid of its backwardness. If not, President Medvedev can do nothing about it.
Alexander Chudodeyev