Nezavisimaya Gazeta: “New President, Old System”
Living under Medvedev does not necessarily mean living after Putin.
The state system's organisation and the principles of its operation have not changed greatly since Dmitry Medvedev was elected president of Russia. All forms, previously worked out by the system, remain, undergoing only minimal stylistic changes or being renamed in some cases. Both the president and the prime minister frequently meet with regional governors. The format of such meetings and their agenda largely resemble the old-style format when Putin was president and Medvedev was first deputy prime minister in charge of priority national projects.
The country of councils
The number of presidential councils and commissions has increased somewhat and now exceeds 20. The Council for Implementation of Priority National Projects and the Demographic Policy, which is the largest council, has met only once, in December 2008. Moreover, it took over a year to establish its three working groups on specific national projects.
Two new councils, namely, the Council to Promote the Information Society and the Council for the Affairs of Disabled Persons, formed under Medvedev in November-December 2008, have met once each. The Council for Cossacks Affairs that had existed for three years under President Boris Yeltsin and was reinstated in January 2009 has not met even once. Although the Council for Development of Local Governments was reinstated by Medvedev in August 2008, it has not held even one full-fledged meeting by late 2009. The Council to Combat Corruption, the Council to Promote Physical Fitness and Sports, now facilitating preparations for the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, and the Council to Promote Institutions of Civil Society seem more active than the rest. All of them have met repeatedly and have initiated ideas implemented in the form of government decisions and new laws.
The president oversees the work of five out of nine commissions, namely, the Commission on Civil Service Reform and Development, the Commission to Examine the Candidacies of Federal-Court Judges, the Commission on Military Technical Cooperation, the Commission on State Awards and the Commission on the State Programme to Resettle Compatriots. As compared to old-style commissions, these commissions have a slightly different format (their restructuring was competed in 2008). Four new commissions were established under Medvedev. The Commission on Forming and Training the Administrative Personnel Reserve which announced plans to train the presidential personnel reserve and regional personnel reserves was established in August 2008. The Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russian Interests was established in May 2009. Judging by its awkward name, the commission resembles a Soviet-era organisation. The Commission for Modernisation and Technological Development of Russia's Economy, the President's favourite brainchild, was established in May 2009. The newest Commission to Improve Unified State Exam Conduct, established in October 2009, is expected to submit its recommendations by mid-December.
Of all the new and revamped presidential councils and commissions, only the Commission for Modernisation and Technological Development of Russia's Economy transcends traditional bureaucratic boundaries. The Commission, which comprises two deputy prime ministers, the economic development minister, the trade and industry minister, the telecommunications and mass communications minister and the education and science minister, as well as the CEOs of state-owned corporations, meets each month, often outside Moscow. Medvedev once told commission members that he hoped that those present would prioritise their commission-related objectives in between the commission's meetings. The implementation of numerous presidential instructions is discussed every week by an improvised commission presidium headed by Sergei Sobyanin, deputy prime minister and chief of staff of the Government's Executive Office, and Vladislav Surkov, first deputy head of the Presidential Executive Office. Working groups which also accomplish various objectives charted five modernisation guidelines set forth in the President's 2009 state-of-the-nation address. Over 600 billion roubles have been allocated for implementing the commission's projects. It appears that Medvedev's Toy Army comprises an economic sector and a budgetary segment that he can control and disburse.
Old scenarios for new development
Although the political system is subjected to tough criticism by Medvedev's entourage and others, Medvedev, who never makes tough general statements, did not make specific proposals to overhaul the system. Medvedev's 2008 state-of-the-nation address stipulated a No. 1 political package that was subsequently implemented. At best, this package decorates the existing system with pseudo-democratic lace, including a conciliatory prize for political parties failing to jump the 7% election hurdle. Such parties will receive one or two seats in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. At worst, the No. 1 political package continues to make the system tougher. For instance, candidates no longer have to deposit a bond during registration. The two exceptions are a decision to increase the presidential term and the State Duma's tenure of office, motivated by some sublime time-serving considerations, and a demand that members of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, take part in preliminary local or regional elections.
The latter probably aims to strengthen control of United Russia party's functionaries over the formation of the Federation Council. The procedure for appointing governors or nominating their candidacies, to be more exact, virtually changes nothing but only formalises the top role of Vladimir Putin as United Russia's leader.
Political package No. 2, set forth in the 2009 state-of-the-nation address, spreads the federal political system's structure to regional level. This primarily implies the formation of legislatures in line with party tickets. Considering the nationwide situation, this drastically strengthens United Russia's partisan bureaucracy, curbs public political competition and weakens the mechanisms of direct contacts and feedback between the people and the government.
The independence of the courts is also being encroached upon under diametrically opposite slogans. The amended law on the Constitutional Court virtually allows the president to appoint the Court's Chairman.
Even limited positive achievements with regard to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are a continuation of old-time trends. The Kremlin acts as a gardener who first removes everything he considers undesirable from the vegetable garden and then nourishes what is left.
Elections and ratings
Multi-vector election trends set in during crisis-ridden 2008. This was manifested in full measure during the spring-time and autumn-time elections in 2009. Although the mostly repressive electoral system remains, changes aiming to liberalise election practice took place in early 2009. Acting on Moscow's orders, local authorities who barred candidates from the election race either reinstated them, including Boris Nemtsov in Sochi, or behaved less zealously. United Russia also prioritised greater publicity and more active political competition inside the party, including discussion clubs or primaries.
The fall-time elections of 2009, especially in Moscow and Astrakhan, showed that the Kremlin needs "positive" results, regardless of the price. The government became "addicted," after activating the election-rigging mechanism. Now that it has been announced that United Russia's popularity in Moscow has soared by 50%, any fair outcome of elections would resemble a setback or a fiasco, making the escalation of lies almost inevitable.
Analysts say only 20-25% of Moscow's electorate came to the polls. In this situation, the elections are losing their significance for the government's legitimacy. The elections have all other functions, including the training and selection of politicians, the formulation of the agenda, the testing and streamlining of programmes, as well as direct contacts and feedback between the government and the people. What will replace them? Will elections be replaced by a system for assessing the effectiveness of regional administrations in line with 40 criteria that were introduced by Putin but started working in 2008? Or will they give way to a system for creating the personnel reserve when each analyst invited by the Kremlin writes his own list or by public reception offices or ratings?
Trust in the leader is the only foundation of legitimacy facilitating the system's relative political stability in conditions of weak institutions. Putin is now trusted by 80% of those polled. However, it would be logical to expect such ratings to dwindle at this time of crisis. The government continues to steadily implement the populist line contrary to economic factors, rather than with their support. Naturally, this situation cannot last long because one fine day there will be nothing left to prop up the ratings if the crisis lasts longer than the government expects. Unnaturally high ratings could therefore come tumbling down.
There are no two ratings with regard to Medvedev and Putin. There are only the ratings of Putin, and their reflection, be it the ratings of Medvedev or even the vote in support of United Russia. In the past two years, Medvedev has done nothing to create his own ratings. He has been and will remain Putin's shadow and his retouched photo for external use.
All this makes the pime minister and the entire system hostages to the ratings. After a certain moment, the system starts working for the ratings, rather than the other way round.
Who are the people?
Any institutional changes are lacking, there are only some personal and stylistic changes.
The entire, old or new, administrative team supports Putin. Even the Presidential Executive Office has been preserved in a form inherited by Dmitry Medvedev. Only two of its top officials were appointed by the new president.
The president's own team mostly exists in the imagination of analysts who believe that the promotion of Medvedev's former fellow students from St Petersburg State University's law faculty amounts to a well-organised expansion into various administrative spheres. Incidentally, such people began to be promoted even before Medvedev was elected president. True, we are witnessing an extremely gradual expansion which is confined to legal and law-enforcement spheres. However, there is no evidence of the fact that the newcomers constitute an integral team. Moreover, they occupy key positions in some key departments, including the Prosecutor-General's Office, rather than the most important agencies.
Of the 15 regional leaders appointed under Medvedev, only three officials can be called pro-Medvedev in terms of their type and political logic. They are President Boris Ebzeyev of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, Kirov Region Governor Nikita Belykh, a former leader of the Union of Right Forces (SPS), and President Yunus-bek Yevkurov of the Republic of Ingushetia, a former army colonel. Although these people do not influence the overall situation, each appointment is interesting in itself. In this sense, Medvedev's clientele is quite large. Notably, the new State Council Presidium, appointed by the president in December 2009, for the first time mostly comprises regional leaders appointed by him.
Unlike Putin's first term with German Gref's Centre for Strategic Studies, no serious attempts are made to draft programmes, except technological modernisation within the format of Medvedev's new Commission for Modernisation and Technological Development of Russia's Economy. A struggle is on between "intellectual headquarters," including attempts to acquire this status. the Institute of Modern Development, whose council of trustees is headed by the president, claims the right to play this role. However, Medvedev does not maintain direct ties with the Institute which submits various proposals on its own initiative. Moreover, such proposals resemble rough drawings, rather than specific projects.
New aspects include those deliberately cultivated by the government and those implemented against its will. The decision-making system is malfunctioning more frequently. This includes the replacement of single social tax with insurance premiums, negotiations on Moscow's accession to the World Trade Organization, the law on trade and the raising of transport tax. All this shows that strong-willed decisions made in the absence of an effective system for the coordination of interests were not well-balanced enough and were subsequently modified or abolished due to specific circumstances or even willfully. A number of other episodes, including the prime minister's tough statement on Mechel, a leading Russian mining and iron-and-steel company that caused a stock-market slump, the case of Yevgeny Chichvarkin, the founder of the largest Russian mobile phone retailer Yevroset, the shutdown of the Moscow-based Cherkizovo market, the largest wholesale market in Russia, and numerous other minor incidents when ill-conceived and unskilled official intervention, frequently exercised in the name of someone's corporate, departmental and even personal interests, causes serious image-related or economic losses for the country.
This is explained by dwindling resources and tougher competition for them, the need to make unorthodox decisions more quickly, low administrative and managerial effectiveness and the so-called "manual control" against the backdrop of unskilled administrators, the lack of filters and fool-proofing mechanisms. The lack of a public policy causes various discussions on highly important issues to be absorbed by the administrative system where subordination shuts up officials, and where only inter-departmental mistakes are possible.
Mutual alliances and mutual rivalry
It should be said that the entire cumbersome administrative system which accomplishes standard objectives and relays signals from the top is unable to function in conditions of crisis. Officials are disoriented by contradictory signals coming in from all directions. In this sense, the crisis is contraindicative to the "tandem," no matter how formal or inwardly harmonic it may be.
Members of the "duumvirate" who seldom appear in public together frequently launch indirect dialogue and opinion exchanges, correcting each other. As a rule, Putin launches such dialogues, with Medvedev joining in and playing his part. Sometimes it happens the other way round, just like in statements about the role of Josef Stalin and state-owned corporations. Medvedev and Putin perform like two "tenors," while discussing their involvement in the 2012 presidential elections. They also performed in unison at the September meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club and in Moscow and Rome in December.
It appears that Medvedev does not merely want to clarify his own stance which is different from that of Putin and to distance himself from government actions, but that he resorts to systemic image-making. All this is intended for the Russian audience. At the same time, one gets the impression that the Putin team is deliberately tarnishing Medvedev's reputation as the main national leader, and that this campaign caters to international audiences.
On the whole, it is difficult to assess the consequences of some behind-the-scenes innovations because the entire system is opaque. The latter include orders for all officials and their families to fill out income declarations and the check of state-owned corporations in 2009 on the President's initiative. The check involved the Prosecutor-General's Office and the Presidential Control Directorate. Some analysts said this was almost a revision of the Putin line and an attack on Putin's supporters, all the more so as Sergei Chemezov was sacked from the Commission for Modernisation and Technological Development of Russia's Economy for his failure to attend its meetings. The check culminated in a report by Prosecutor-General Yury Chaika and Presidential Aide Konstantin Chuichenko, chief of the Presidential Control Directorate. The report was received by Medvedev in the run-up to his state-of-the-nation address which said state-owned corporations lacked any prospects. The report also cricitised Anatoly Chubais, CEO of Russian Nanotechnology Corporation, one of the newest and not very cost-effective state-owned corporations. Vladimir Putin soon publicly replied to Medvedev during the December 3, 2009 question-and-answer session. Putin said state-owned corporations were not good or bad, and that they were a necessity. Putin also stressed that national leaders had reached consensus on the issue, and that they had drafted decisions as regards the establishment of state-owned corporations.
Nikolai Petrov is a member of the Carnegie Moscow Centre's Academic Council. The article's enlarged version is published in the Pro & Contra magazine.
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The government became "addicted," after activating the election-rigging mechanism.
Nikolai Petrov
