Russia is entering the third stage of its development since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Each stage builds on the previous stage without negating it. That is why historical continuity makes modernization according to Medvedev an absolutely real proposition.
Last year, the task of national development (modernization is the trendy word) confronted the country directly. President Medvedev's article "Forward, Russia" provided the toughest analysis of the current state of affairs-even against the background of criticism from the opposition- and represents an attempt to understand how that situation has arisen. Perhaps previous years have seen nothing but mistakes? Or, as some people claim, mistakes were made only under Putin while the 1990s saw democracy flourish? Or could it be that those who claim that Yeltsin and Gaidar ruined the country are right?
It is customary in Russia to forget history quickly or, against the background of universal amnesia, to interpret events in one's own favour. Therefore a historical flashback is in order.
President Putin's tasks
When Vladimir Putin became President, he faced three key tasks.
The first problem was Chechen separatism. When he was still Prime Minister, Putin had the guts to administer a tough response to aggression in Dagestan. As he would later say addressing the State Duma (again in his next capacity as the Prime Minister), the Army had been inept and crude and had turned Chechnya into a bloodbath, but the problem of preserving the country's integrity had been solved. For awhile, terrorism continued spreading almost all over Russia, as planes were blown up, theatres seized and children murdered. But by the middle of the decade, some of the more acute manifestations of terror had been suppressed and today terrorism is confined to the North Caucasus. Final victory is a long way off - maybe years or decades - but one cannot deny progress.
The second problem was the regional leaders who sometimes behaved like feudal lords. They had grabbed as much sovereignty as they could under President Yeltsin's tacit approval. These governors were emerging as the main political force in the country. My colleagues, Alexander Privalov and Alexander Volkov, recently described them as "demounters of Russian lands" in their Ekspert article. The local and private interests of regional bosses ran counter to the country's interests. The Federation Council, where the governors sat, could have become the key political institution in the country, capable of blocking Kremlin initiatives. Putin changed the way that government body was formed, an action that was seen as the disbanding of the Federation Council. In this way, he stemmed the tide of feudalization of the country's political system.
The third problem was how to deal with the oligarchs. At present, the term is a misnomer as it is used simply to describe business tycoons. However, in the 1990s they were true oligarchs; that is, the country's richest people had a big say in political decisions and could bypass and even counter the laws of government and democratic institutions. Putin first chased Gusinsky and Berezovsky out of the country and then made all the other oligarchs "equidistant" from the government. The Khodorkovsky case marked the climax of that battle. What is stronger: government power or money? This was the key issue in the drama. The state is stronger, the answer was quickly and universally understood. Thus, Vladimir Putin stopped the very real prospect of disintegration of the country and overcame the drift towards feudalism and oligarchy. As a result of these political actions, the much-maligned "vertical power structure" was instantly built up, but was simply another name for a hastily constructed state that was creaky and imperfect, but once again functional.
Some losses occurred along the way. Two liberal parties, the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko, lost the 2003 elections in the State Duma. The sidelining of the former was a particularly unpleasant development. The party held many seats and was influential in the State Duma; it supported Putin's economic policy and was supposed to represent the interests of Russian business and newly advanced social groups in politics.
The failure of the liberals was a wakeup call that signaled the simplification of the country's social and political system, which of course is dangerous for a democratic country and, coupled with the restoration of the "vertical power structure," signified the triumph of bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy and the crisis
"Why are the Russian people still not dead?" was an article by outstanding sociologist Teodor Shanin in a "programmatic" issue of Ekspert published ten years ago, which asked why Russian society did not perish after the mayhem of the early 90s. Mr Shanin used the concept of expolar/informal structures as an answer to this question. Connections, bribes, nepotism, entire networks of relations based on kinship, cronyism, criminal relations, etc. are just some examples of expolar relations. These relations, in Shanin's opinion, enabled the social environment and individuals to survive. One has to go along with that thesis. But there is another side to the matter. In the same article, Teodor Shanin writes: "Almost everything functions: teachers teach, doctors treat patients, officers command, police controls road traffic, most city streets are cleaned, water, electricity and gas are fed to homes..." "Almost everything that functioned - police, schools, hospitals, utilities agencies, local government, and even the Army - are bureaucratic structures that perform their work. These structures are very strong because they are givens and their functions are clearly defined, which enables them to operate even in emergency conditions, forming and sustaining the warp and woof of social life."
An effective bureaucracy is perhaps the main achievement of the modern state, and in a somewhat loose interpretation of Max Weber, it will hold out until last by dint of its internal structure. We have seen this in Russia.
Putin's "vertical power structure" emerged so quickly because all the elements of the structure had continued to function under the surface and reacted to the President's signals instantly.
The achievements of the 2000s
Let us first look at the results of the outgoing decade before revisiting the issue of bureaucracy.
An unbiased analysis (which has a hard time taking root in Russia) fetches up some startling results. The above-mentioned issue of Ekspert from ten years ago provided some forecasts (Tatyana Gurova) that were so optimistic as to be mocked at the time by many readers and analysts. First, the issue claimed that Russia would experience an economic boom in two or three years' time. One could attribute the economic boom to various factors - commodities, concatenation of circumstances and just plain luck - but the fact remains that Russia did experience a boom. Second, we mentioned the expansion of big companies to provincial regions and the spread of the technologies of production, sales, and management as a key factor of economic growth. Since then, the forecast has been vindicated, capitalism has expanded (so far, of course, only to large cities), which, incidentally, contributed to the growth of the middle class. Finally, we predicted a rapid growth of income, by an average 12% a year (in dollars) over the next twenty years. What seemed a wildly optimistic forecast materialized with a vengeance. The average monthly income per capita rose from $50 after the 1998 crisis to $750 before the latest crisis, in the summer of 2008 (see chart). Thus, over ten years, average income increased 15 times in dollars and 3.7 times in roubles (adjusted for inflation).
In general, the chart showing the dynamics of per capita incomes is very revealing. In the 1990s, the low level and the huge fluctuations attested to the instability of the system; the past decade has seen a continuous sustained growth. It would be naïve to attribute this striking difference solely to the fluctuations in commodity markets. Early in the decade, when incomes were already growing fast, the oil price was around $25 per barrel, and even three years ago it was cheaper than it is today. Not only the commodity sectors were growing, but industry, trade, and financial institutions as well. I believe that an important, if not primary factor behind economic growth was the solution of the political tasks referred to above. That stability, so resented by many, produced an explosion of investments, including foreign investments, and a colossal growth of the capitalization of Russian companies.
Continuity between decades
Does this praise of the last decade indicate that positive processes took place only in these years as opposed to the "confounded" 1990s? Far from it. The country's development has gone through two distinct stages.
In the 1990s, we got private ownership, the separation of powers, democratic institutions, and basic civil rights. Thousands of private companies sprang up that not only divided socialist property, but learned to live in the new market conditions, which brought a sea change to the country's economy. It was the readiness of companies to work effectively that made rapid economic growth possible when favourable conditions arose. But such conditions, no matter how favourable, cannot generate products or services.
The country also experienced turbulence. It was in permanent economic and political crisis. The social system was extremely unstable, the quality of life was deteriorating, and government institutions were used by a small group of individuals to further their own ends. It would be naïve to say, as some opinion journalists do now, that what happened in the 1990s was effective democracy.
We have already mentioned the positive achievements of the 2000s. To this, one should add a significant change of social structure: a new middle class emerged, and its share of the population is already at least 20%. Russia is back as an independent player in the world arena. Few people now know the name of the current managing director of the IMF, but every granny knew the name of the IMF chief in the 1990s, Michel Camdessus, and when he visited Russia, he came as the boss.
That slavish dependence on foreign institutions went hand-in-hand with wholesale domestic corruption (its roots, of course, are in the 1990s), the degradation of state institutions, for example, the police, massive bureaucratization of political life, and the weakening of the media. Negatives can be multiplied. But if one looks at the last two decades without prejudice and from a historical point of view, a progressive movement is evident even though some of the old problems persist and new ones crop up.
Comparing the two past decades of the new Russia is untenable. There is no such thing as the Putin state. Simply put, the democratic state created in the 1990s began working and only started to realize its potential in the 2000s. This progressive movement is extremely rapid. During - not the life but the active period of one generation - a new country has been recreated that has good prospects for development. Of late, China has been frequently mentioned as a model of rapid positive change. My feeling is that Russia is changing every bit as fast as its eastern neighbour. Only, the changes differ in character and sequence, and the disarray of the perestroika years that determined it cannot be undone.
Likewise, it is wrong to compare President Medvedev to Putin's rule. This period of intensive development was prepared by the previous decade. It was Putin who, as President, repeatedly said that innovation was the only development strategy for this country.
The nexus of decades in today's Russia is manifested not in disparities but, on the contrary, in the inherent continuity of politics. The 1990s saw the creation of the main social and state institutions (which the oligarchs and regional bosses had deftly harnessed to their own interests); the 2000s saw a "purging" of these institutions, which gave a powerful impetus to the economic and social structures; and the 2010s are giving an impetus to the country's transition to steady development.
The danger of simple solutions
A shortage of people who have determination and are willing to get things done is arguably the main problem today.
"Progressive" commentators lament that in recent years all the effective and independent political forces have been "rolled into the asphalt." One has to agree that some losses have occurred (for example SPS). However, that was an objective process-the restoration of an effective state had excessive bureaucratization as its downside.
"Progressive" analysts call for an immediate democratization and liberalization of politics, which allegedly would kick-start the modernization of the country. What is meant by democratization? Very simple measures: for example, restoring direct election of governors or bringing down the percentage of the votes required for a party to get into the State Duma. In short, a repeal of the measures taken under President Putin to consolidate his political base. These are facile solutions, but unfortunately they are not only meaningless but harmful.
The political reform had its logic and its aims, including the strengthening of political parties, which was one of the reasons for raising the cutoff barrier. The reform by and large achieved its goals (this article does not purport to discuss its results in detail) while the proposed measures would restore the political situation that existed ten years ago by claiming that it was more democratic. Behind these proposals are the fears of sections of the public that the country will drift towards authoritarianism and the curtailment of freedoms. But that ignores the importance of the state itself, whose better functioning ensured the successes of the past decade. Those who fear authoritarianism make the state their target. Of course, without a strong state, there can be no authoritarianism. But there will never be an effective democracy either, because the road to democracy lies through the strong statehood. This has long become a commonplace in the studies of leading modern European and American sociologists. This is the path Russia is following.
Simplistic democratization supplants complicated and multifarious problems of a country's transitional development with one simple move: let us implement political reform (i.e. reverse the recent decisions) and wait for the results. Some eggheads call it institutionalism and others perestroika-2, seeing nothing but pluses in it and forgetting that it led not only to the demise of communism, but to the collapse of a huge country, civil wars, social degradation, etc.
To strengthen the political sphere
Where does one find the active individuals who are so sorely lacking? Perhaps the answer lies in strengthening the political sphere (not to be confused with "democratization").
The relationship between bureaucracy and politics is a fundamental problem that is not unique to Russia. For example, that great project, the European Union, is based on bureaucracy. Numerous critics point out that bureaucracy flouts the very foundations of European democracy, and they have a point.
Max Weber maintained that the modern bureaucratic state cannot hope to develop if it has no politicians. The core of the Army is its officers, but the battles are conducted and won by top commanders; companies are run by managers, but entrepreneurs create them, ensure breakthroughs, and introduce innovations. The same is true of the state. Only politicians-that is, those who seek power in order to achieve socially relevant goals and do not shirk responsibility-can change countries and the world. The political sphere in present-day Russia is weak, which is a natural consequence of the events of the past decades.
The country can be put on track of development in two ways. The first is the Caesarian way (I deliberately do not use the term "authoritarian," which is not quite accurate or appropriate), in which a leader assumes whole responsibility and manages the bureaucracy "in manual gear." This path is exemplified by Bismarck in the Germany of the second half of the 19th century. Putin's rule has a Caesarian character in some ways. But is Vladimir Putin inclined towards Caesarianism? Unlikely. First, he has renounced a third presidential term although he could easily have amended the Constitution several years ago; second, he promoted Dmitry Medvedev to presidency, a person with a thoroughly "civilian" mentality signaling the need to adjust course towards the development of democratic institutions.
The second path is strengthening the political sphere and the search for and promotion of new responsible leaders. That path merits a more detailed discussion.
The United Russia party today dominates the country's parliament and practically all regions. Part of the original plan was precisely to create a strong party as a vehicle for changing legislation in the centre and in the provinces. However, there are at least two circumstances on the negative side of the ledger. First, the UR has become overly bureaucratic; but moreover, it has monopolized political career paths. If you want to be somebody, join the UR. President Medvedev has already indicated that he is unhappy with this situation. But what is United Russia to do? To retreat, to yield ground to its rivals, to lose elections? This is an odd way to behave for a political force whose natural task is to struggle for power and win elections. In addition, many members of our politically wobbly bureaucratic class have, over the past eighteen years, repeatedly switched parties, their only concern being to find the most comfortable perch. If they suddenly decide that the UR is not the unquestioned favourite of the country's leaders, they may well start leaving the party in droves, jumping out of the boat and even overturning it. United Russia's leadership must be preserved.
However, other parties could get to share some of the responsibility. I stress: responsibility and not just the freedom to criticize the decisions made by those in power. One might call it the sharing of responsibility. For example, if a political party wins a fair number of votes in a regional election, let it get a certain number of positions (committees) in the local parliament, which, incidentally, is frequently the case. But let it get some positions in the executive branch as well, thus sharing the responsibility for the state of affairs in the region with the governing party.
Opposition parties should not only criticize the authorities but prepare their own reports on key problems to which local governments would be obliged to react.
So far we have been speaking about regional authorities, but in the future, such mechanisms could be introduced at the federal level as well.
The closer link between electoral performance and the distribution of positions (to be cynical) would provide active citizens with alternative career paths, bring fresh substance to political struggle, and ultimately make for better governance. The dominance of the UR would be challenged (provided, of course, that the party continues to win elections).
Another example of the strengthening of the political sphere that may promote new leaders, odd though it may sound, is the presidential Modernization Commission. It engages many politically active workers of merit, some of whom may become new leaders. The Commission's procedure is not institutional but essentially bureaucratic: pass new laws and recommendations designed to improve the environment and wait for it to sprout; if it doesn't, hide behind the law. The Commission's work is target-oriented. As its member, Mikhail Prokhorov, said in an interview with Ekspert, the Commission operates like a good business: first, areas of interest are identified, then priority projects are named, and finally, investments are planned. Only then does the Commission proceed to address the "systemic pathologies" for which it was designed. Thus, institutions are changed with an eye to concrete tasks, to achieving concrete results.
It will take ten years to put the country on an innovative path. We witness only the start of the project. If, ten years from now, the innovation sphere is economically significant and not microscopic as it is today, if projects with world perspectives are launched (Russian "Samsungs") then the aims of that stage will have been achieved. I think that is highly probable.
On Chaadayev
Russia has not given anything to the world. All the worthwhile things that it has come from Europe, and one cannot expect anything else, for this is the destiny of our country. That sums up, with some exaggeration, the main thesis of our famous "opposition philosopher" Pyotr Chaadayev. His "Philosophical Letters," written in the late 1820s, outraged the authorities and were rejected by most of the enlightened public. However, this view of the country was gaining popularity and was practically embraced by the Russian intelligentsia towards the end of the century.
Oddly enough, that view is flourishing and is all but predominant in the country to this day. I say "oddly enough" because Chaadayev was obviously mistaken. When he was writing his paper, Pushkin's genius was already shining (Pushkin, by the way, unequivocally rejected Chaadayev's ideas); shortly afterwards, the world witnessed the rise of great Russian literature and music (which was slightly less important for the world than literature, but still very significant); the beginning of the next century saw the Russian avant garde: art, design, ballet, film... Finally, one should mention the grandiose social experiment, the Russian Revolution, the meaning and significance of which may be debatable, but the influence of which on world history has been at least as great as the French Revolution, as all serious scholars admit.
What else is needed to prove the significance of one's own country, its history and culture? And yet we still hear the Russian-Soviet intelligentsia bemoaning "oppression" of a different kind. Are these lamentations important? Can they influence not only the media, as they obviously do, but determine political and underlying social developments? Hardly. It looks as if the processes that unfolded in this country in the last decades are so powerful and the direction has been so firmly set by history itself that it is impossible to stop or reverse them.
Valery Fadeyev