In 2010, Russia is sure to get new ministers and governors, new laws, and presidential decrees that improve people's lives or make them more difficult. But what will remain unchanged, in the opinion of our observer Dmitry Kamyshev, is the tandemocracy regime established in the spring of 2008.
The president and the Prime Minister
If there are still people in and outside Russia who believe that the ruling Russian tandem (Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin) is about to fall apart, they should abandon all hope in 2010. The only thing that could cause a falling out between the members of the ruling duo is their decision to take part in the next presidential elections. But in any case, that decision will not be taken before the second half of 2011 after the start of the State Duma elections campaign.
This of course will not prevent the journalists and political analysts from showing an interest in both leaders' plans for 2012. However, the stock questions will elicit stock answers, such as "when the time comes we will sit down and decide everything." The time has not yet come and Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin continue to demonstrate that they think alike and act in concert. Occasional frictions between their teams, such as the case of Podrabinek last year or the behind-the-scenes struggle over the law on trade, will be nothing but exceptions that confirm the rule.
Contributing to the smooth work of the tandem is the final delimitation of scopes of authority between its members (see Vlast No.50 of December 21, 2009): because the President's and the Prime Minister's spheres of responsibility practically do not overlap, there is no cause for conflict. As long as Medvedev has modernisation and Putin the crisis on their hands (even if there is no second wave of the crisis, it will not end in 2010), they will hardly have pause to make unwanted inroads into each other's scopes of authority.
Another guarantee of peaceful coexistence between the two leaders is the steadily diminishing time that they appear in public together. In other words, the less the President and the Prime Minister are seen together in public, the less chance there is that they would, even inadvertently, "break the covenant" and venture into each other's areas of competence. One could already observe this trend last year: while in 8 months of 2008, Medvedev and Putin took part in 47 joint events, the number was 44 in the whole of 2009. By comparison, in the first two years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, the picture was entirely different: in 2000, he appeared in public with Prime Minister Kasyanov 61 times, and in 2001, 81 times.
On the one hand, this is a direct consequence of the changed configuration of power. As president, Putin personally steered the work of the Government (*).
[* On Putin's way of communicating with his subordinates see No.16 for 2005]
In addition to working meetings with the Prime Minister and traditional Saturday meetings with the Security Council members, he also conducted meetings of the Cabinet every Monday. In September 2004, availing himself of his constitutional right, the head of state even chaired an enlarged meeting of the Government on the fight against terror. With the creation of the tandem, the President's role changed. Dmitry Medvedev studiously avoids interfering with the current activities of the Cabinet, meets with the ministers no more than a couple of times a month and not on fixed dates but to discuss concrete problems. President Medvedev attended two government meetings, both at the end of the year, in order to thank its members for their good work.
On the other hand, the meaning of the public meetings between the two leaders has also changed since 2008. While previously these events left no doubts as to who was ‘the boss' in the country, now they underscore the equality of the members of the tandem regardless of their differing status under the Constitution. The former format of most of the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister, in which "the boss gives directives to his subordinate," did not generate such an impression. The new approach was highlighted by the coverage of joint events in the news programmes of the three federal TV channels (Channel 1, Rossiya, and NTV), which are watched by most ordinary Russians and provide them with information about their leaders.
Television coverage of such meetings has diminished in 2009, especially if one compares the first two years of Medvedev's presidency with the same period of Putin's presidency (see Chart). Moreover, it is worth noting exactly which joint events are covered (or rather, which events the Kremlin press service allows to be shown): preference is given to the meetings in which the staging itself naturally puts the two protagonists on equal footing. That accounts for the popularity of informal communication, be it a dinner with former French President Jacques Chirac or a walk along the waterfront in Sochi, where Medvedev and Putin, regardless of their rank, project an image of bosom friends. For the same reason, reports on the working meetings at which the President and the Prime Minister sit opposite each other are always accompanied by pictures and television reports, unlike the meetings of the Security Council, at which Dmitry Medvedev sits at the head of the table (the current Prime Minister misses these events far more often than his predecessor). Finally, the once popular television genre of "the boss gives a dressing-down to his subordinates" now typically shows only the President and not the Prime Minister. If they appear in the picture together, their dialogue is usually reduced to the exchange of mutually complementary statements.
Judging from the fact in the new year, the public first saw Medvedev and Putin skiing at Krasnaya Polyana, the updated format of political broadcasting will be widely used in 2010 as well. Accordingly, there will be more and more stories in which the President and the Prime Minister have tea together, play badminton, or watch a football match, reinforcing people's faith in the invincible tandem. Meanwhile, dialogues between the two leaders during the course of official events are likely to be exchanges of pleasantries.
Bosses and subordinates
The relations between the state's leaders and their immediate subordinates in 2010 are likely to be in line with the traditions established during the first two years of Medvedev's presidency.
At the federal level, personnel changes since the Putin government was confirmed in May 2008 have been few and far between: in October 2008, Regional Development Minister Dmitry Kozak became Deputy Prime Minister, to be succeeded by Viktor Basargin, and in March 2009, Yelena Skrynnik replaced Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev, who was appointed Governor of the Voronezh Region. The rate of "one new government members a year" will surely be retained in 2010: in his November Address to the Federal Assembly, the President promised to appoint someone personally responsible for the state of affairs "in the North Caucasus." Because that person must have "sufficient powers to effectively coordinate work in this area," he may well have the rank of Deputy Prime Minister.
However, one cannot rule out that there will be more newcomers to the government because vacancies may appear when ministers quit their jobs to become governors. Only, unlike Gordeyev, who, according to the official version, asked to be given a chance to work "on the land," his former colleagues will probably be dispatched to the regional capitals to fulfill "special assignments" from the centre-for example, when the Kremlin needs trusted candidates to fill the post of governor in critical Russian regions. One can hardly expect ministers to be sacked for bad work in 2010, if only because Prime Minister Putin hardly ever sacked blundering officials hotfoot during his own presidency.
As for the heads of regions, they have no cause to be complacent this year. Out of the 22 governors appointed by Medvedev in 2008-2009, only six have kept their jobs, and in the first week of 2010, one out of three (has already been terminated (whereas out of the seven recently elected governors, only four have been reappointed under the new procedure, just as Vlast predicted a year ago). At the end of 2009, the President declared that most governors will now work for no more than three terms: "the fourth term is a rare exception, and we will seek to vacate seats for younger people." So, the renewal of the body of governors in 2010 may affect some political heavyweights who have headed their regions since the 1990s.
Proceeding from that assumption, the high-risk group includes even such authoritative regional leaders as Alexander Filipenko (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area), Mintimer Shaimiyev (Tatarstan), Pyotr Sumin (Chelyabinsk Region) and Vladimir Chub (Rostov Region), whose third or even fourth gubernatorial terms expire in 2010. Another old-timer, the head of the Jewish Autonomous Area, Nikolai Volkov, is sure to quit because he is not even on the list of candidates submitted to the President by United Russia party. On the other hand, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (Kalmykia), Nikolai Fyodorov (Chuvashia), and Aman Tuleyev (Kemerovo Region), although long-serving, may end up on the list of rare exceptions mentioned by the President because they are irreplaceable, just like the head of the Kurgan Region, Oleg Bogomolov, who was reappointed for a fourth term on December 29.
At the same time, one cannot help noticing that Dmitry Medvedev's political appointments last year did not always coincide with United Russia's plans. For example, United Russia proposed two strong party candidates for governor of the Kurgan Region: Igor Barinov, State Duma deputy and the head of the party's Interregional Coordination Council in the Urals, and Vyacheslav Timchenko, Chairman of the Duma Committee on Local Government. However, the President opted for the incumbent, Bogomolov, whose chances of being reappointed were thought to be very slim. The new governor of the Volgograd Region is not Valery Yazev, who seemed to have earned the job by his dedicated work for the party as Deputy Duma speaker over many years, but Anatoly Brovko, Vice Governor and a close associate of the former communist governor, Nikolai Maksyuta. So one can predict that this year, too, the President will not necessarily take his cues from the governing party in making his appointments.
Power and the people
While the Kremlin's actions with regard to lower-level bosses reveal some pattern, the relations between government and the common people, as usual, will be extremely contradictory (see fact sheet).
True, most of the Kremlin's actions admittedly are good for ordinary people. For example, in the new year, the country's leadership continues to hand out money to Russians even though the economic crisis is not yet over. Pensions should increase considerably due to valorization. Families with two or more children will finally be allowed to spend the "mother's capital," and the owners of old cars will get 50,000 roubles for surrendering their cars for scrap on condition that they buy new ones. The authorities believe that people's material well-being will improve due to decisions on the state regulation of the price of vital medicines, setting the minimum price of a half a litre bottle of vodka at 89 roubles, and introducing a law on trade that allows the government to set caps on the retail prices of certain staple foods.
In 2010, the conventional wisdom that dictates that you can never tell whether a mansion or a cellblock is in store for you will no longer be relevant. That will apply to persons accused of tax evasion for the first time, who will not be prosecuted if they pay the back taxes and will remain free until trial. Citizens indicted of lesser crimes will also have a better deal: as of January 10, they may merely be put under house arrest. Finally, the reform of the Interior Ministry announced by President Medvedev and designed to change the "procedure of selecting candidates for service with the Interior Ministry bodies with due account of their moral, ethical, and psychological characteristics" is designed to generate more trust among ordinary Russians towards the police.
However, along with carrots, there are several whips in store for the citizens. For example, the increase of pensions in spite of the continuing crisis will be accompanied by a dramatic rise in the cost of electricity, gas, transportation, and utility services. In late 2009, the government submitted to the State Duma a draft law that makes "blocking traffic" a criminal offense. So the Russians who try to emulate the heroic behaviour of the people of Pikalyovo, who blocked a federal highway in the summer of 2009 and thus forced Prime Minister Putin to come to their city, will now face a fine of up to 100,000 roubles or up to two years in prison. One can hardly expect tangible changes of the electoral system. After President Medvedev failed to issue an unequivocal command to combat vote-rigging in the wake of the scandalous elections of October, United Russia's victory in March 2010 is sure to be achieved by the same measures.
Ordinary Russians are prepared for any turn of events, according to opinion polls (see charts). Thus, 62% of respondents in a poll by the independent Levada Centre believe that 2009 was worse than 2008. The only other occasion when the Russians had a still more negative assessment was in 1998, when the previous financial crisis broke out. Interestingly, the current assessments are exact replicas of the data for 1996, whose only similarity to 2009 is that in both years, according to opposition observers, there were flagrant electoral violations in favour, respectively, of Boris Yeltsin in the presidential elections and of United Russian candidates in regional and municipal elections. At the same time, after Vladimir Putin came to power, the number of positive assessments of an outgoing year (25% versus 11.8% under Yeltsin) as well as the responses that "the year was the same as the previous one" (an average 47.6% versus 30.8%) increased dramatically. Those who chose the latter answer effectively supported the claim that the main achievement of Putin's presidency was political and economic stability.
On the other hand, a VTsIOM poll that asked respondents to assess the prospects for the coming year shows that there are still many more optimists than pessimists in Russia. The number of those who expect nothing good for themselves in 2010 is under 30%, which matches the potential protest activity index revealed by sociologists at the beginning of the crisis in the autumn of 2008 (see Vlast, No.3 of January 26, 2009).
The fact that Russians, as ever, rely more on themselves than on the country's success as a whole, is added proof that our citizens care much less about what the authorities do than the authorities themselves think.
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What is in store for citizens in 2010
A number of federal laws, government resolutions, and executive orders of government agencies have come into force as of January 1, 2010. Below, we have compiled a brief review of new Russian legislation.
Valorization of pensions, i.e. recalculation of the size of pensions for those who started work before 2002, began on January 1, 2010. On the whole, the pension will increase by 10% plus 1% for each year of work before 1991. Disabled people will receive work pensions depending on the disability category regardless of whether they are able to work or not.
First families will be able to spend "mother's capital" - three years passed since the decision had been taken to support families with children. At present, "mother's capital" amounts to 343,400 roubles.
The state will regulate the price of drugs on the list of vital and necessary medications. Prices for such drugs will be fixed, and the regions' rights to increase these prices will be limited.
The tariffs of natural monopolies have grown. The cost of electricity for households has increased by 10%, and for industrial consumers by 7.6%. Gas prices have gone up 15% for industry and 5% for households. The cost of gas for households will increase another 15% as of April 1, 2010.
The Unified Social Tax has been abolished. Instead, employers will pay 20% of their employees' incomes into the Pension Fund and the Medical and Social Insurance Funds (3.1% and 2.9% respectively). The overall rate of these insurance premiums will remain the same as the Unified Social Tax (26%).
Trial by jury has been introduced in Chechnya, the only Russian region where it was still not functioning. In spite of the introduction of trial by jury throughout the country's territory and the formal right to pass death sentences, the Constitutional Court of Russia has extended the moratorium on capital punishment.
Nine major Russian producers of carbonated beverages, chips, and sweets are committed to limit the advertising of food and drinks for children under 12. The ban covers the products that do not meet the health food criteria established by the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development and children's food standards in Russia.
State and municipal museums, archives, and libraries are exempt from paying VAT when importing cultural valuables from abroad: i.e., independent purchases and gifts from foreign philanthropists will not be taxable by VAT.
The new capital requirement for banks is 90 million roubles. According to the Bank of Russia, 80% of small banks will be able to keep their licenses.
No more licenses will be required for construction activities, design, and engineering prospecting. The actions of construction and design companies will be controlled by self-regulating organizations.
Amendments to the Tax, Criminal, and Criminal-Procedural Codes and the Law On Militsia (Police) have come into force. From now on, persons charged with tax evasion for the first time will not be prosecuted if they redeem the full amount of back taxes and pay the penalties and fines. In addition, a suspect or a person accused of tax evasion may not be remanded in custody.
A single customs tariff of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan came into force from the beginning of the year, which changed import duties on about 18% of items (see p. 31 for details). The Customs Code of the Union is to come into force as of July 1, 2010.
The law providing open and free access for citizens and organizations to information on the activities of government bodies and local government bodies has come into force.
The minimum price of a 0.5 litre bottle of vodka has been fixed at 89 roubles. Vodka that costs less will henceforth be considered a counterfeit product. For bottles of a different size, the minimum price is calculated proportionately.
As of January 10, 2010, a new type of punishment in the form of restriction of freedom has been introduced. House arrest imposed by a court of law means that the indicted person cannot freely change his or her place of residence, of work, or visit certain places. People can be sentenced to house arrest for a term of between two months and four years for less serious crimes. It can also be applied as extra punishment with regard to serious and very serious crimes (for a term of between six months and two years).
The law on retailing will come into force as of February 1, allowing the government to set caps on retail prices for certain staple foods for a term of not more than 90 days.
As of March 1, the deadline for free privatization of housing runs out (the Duma will probably discuss extending the deadline), and as of March 8, the programme of compensations for surrendering domestic-made and foreign-made cars older than 10 years for scrap will come into force.
As of June 26, all packs of cigarettes or other tobacco products will carry a caption "Smoking Kills," occupying at least a third of the front side of the pack. As of July 1, all court rulings are to be posted on the Internet.
Yevgeny Belov