When Mikhail Gorbachev launched his reforms in the middle of the 1980s, he did not have any models to follow. No one before him had been faced with the task of overcoming an economic crisis in a country where free market and open society were non-existent for three generations. There was no one to learn from, and Gorbachev had to tread an unknown path.
But he was not afraid to act. He undertook a real fight against corruption (the "cotton case" for example); allowed dissidents to return (starting with Andrei Sakharov); initiated an unprecedented political reform by introducing political competition through competitive elections to the Soviets; allowed nonpartisans to hold government posts; sanctioned freedom of speech and did not interfere with the nationwide discussion on the country's history. Today's Russian politicians are faced with a similar situation, but unlike Gorbachev, they are afraid to act.
They have inherited a country which is confronted by the very same problems of dependence on raw materials and the very same type of over-centralised political system. The difference, however, is that the needs of corrupt bureaucrats are higher now, their cars are better, and mansions are bigger. The reason for that is not as important as the fact that the fate of Gorbachev's reforms, his Government and the Soviet Union continue to be relevant in today's Russia. They provide an example that Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev cannot afford to ignore. It is clear what they want to avoid. They are afraid that the reforms may leave them out of power. While Gorbachev could not imagine that he would become a president without a country, Putin and Medvedev are well aware of such a possibility.
It appears that the current leaders of the country read the history of the 1980s as follows: Gorbachev initiated perestroika and glasnost and received a collapse of the system as a result; gave freedom to neighbouring countries and received dissolution of the Soviet bloc; allowed political competition and received disintegration of the Soviet Union. Hence, for the leaders of today's Russia, the reforms of the 1980s, from a real fight against corruption to freedom of speech, are associated with threats to their power.
Therefore, Medvedev and Putin are doing everything possible to avoid reforms. They are an "anti-Gorbachev" of sorts of a "Gorbachev with Andropov still alive" if you will. And they have split glasnost and perestroika (that is the struggle against these two phenomena) between them: Medvedev is covering glasnost, while Putin is handling perestroika.
Public statements by Medvedev represent glasnost in reverse or, in other words, freedom of speech from above. The President has already said everything it was possible to say about corruption in general, without mentioning names. On the outside, he has addressed every possible problem faced by the country. But he has stopped short of mentioning real names, which is a precondition for a true freedom of speech from below. It is therefore not surprising that Medvedev does not mind being called a blogger. "I think it is quite normal, as I am, in fact, a blogger," he said recently during a meeting with Belarusian journalists.
In his turn, Prime Minister Putin carries out perestroika in reverse. He ensures that large businesses receive financial assistance from the government, the political system remains extremely inflexible, and "strangers" are kept away from the decision-making offices. And this reflects the role of history in Russia's contemporary politics.
The author is the editor of the Commentaries section in the Vedomosti newspaper; he currently works for Yale University.