The showdown between dogmatists and marginal politicians exhausts politics.
The political process in modern Russia has been distinct in its formation of a new elite, which has gathered renowned overachievers from all disciplines. The Soviet model, which provided ladder-climbing opportunity for only the most zealous party activists and bureaucrats, was displaced by a market economy, private property, an embryonic multi-party system, new relationships and big money.
The new liberal Yeltsin elite, a.k.a. first-wave democrats, could be challenged by neither their predecessors, whom they swept away fiercely and resentfully, nor the leaders of the former Soviet republics, who were not invited to interfere in the affairs of an independent Russia.
Putin's protégés ousted Yeltsin's top-level appointees from the government and government-controlled industries in eight years. To qualify for promotion under Putin, one needs to be a close friend from St Petersburg or a security officer. A loyal security officer from St Petersburg has the best chance to succeed.
The new elite tightened its grip on power almost as capably as the Communist Party did in the Soviet Union.
Soaring real incomes made the government extremely popular but dependant on permanent success, which is impossible to sustain in a capitalist economy with its inevitable fluctuations.
The recession exposed several major problems that the Russian government and society could face. The most critical arise from a near sighted attempt to replicate modern government institutions that ensure a sustained and continuous development based on democracy, competitiveness and efficacious procedures that guarantee popular rule, all necessary in the promotion of the system that works.
In principle, people can go without true democracy for some time settling for a facsimile. There are many examples. The problem is that, as a rule, people are unable to work out development strategies and set tasks and objectives. Populism is inherent in the public conscience and in the political process. However, the penalty for cowardice and gullibility is institutional chaos and a sinking quality of life.
It is natural that the elite should take responsibility for the present and the future of a country. Its members are bound to conduct a dialogue with contemporaries to learn other views on key constitutional principles and values, institutions on which societal norms are based.
If the ruling elite simply don't care then their motivations are purely selfish. They are guided by momentary and near term interests while ignoring the lessons of the past. Opposition parties can also act irresponsibly aiming for unachievable, utopian goals and objectives. Nevertheless, no one seems to dispute the aphorism "Politics is the art of the possible." In reaching for the sky, an idealist can find himself well beyond the bounds of practical politics.
Political positions are being marginalised. The showdown between dogmatists and marginal politicians exhausts politics, makes it incomplete and primitive, and emasculates political culture. The more sophisticated among us are equally averse to the slogans "Putin forever!" and "Putin get out!" Both are short on realistic pragmatism.
This alienates common people from government, with links between participants of political process atrophied.
The formation and rotation of the ruling class based on healthy political competition, free elections and transparent official procedures is in the interests of every leader in the country. These factors allow society, the economy and the regions to develop dynamically, facilitating the breakdown of the government's "thrombi" and the development of a legal culture.
There must be non-violent methods to rectify the disparities and distortions of Russian statehood, without war, revolution or coup. The elite must remain elite after stepping down.
It is in the interests of Russia.