August has not yet brought any major upheavals, so stern critics of Russia have to make do with anniversaries and their analysis, which is a poor substitute for actual catastrophes. However, if stamped paper is not available, one writes on ordinary paper. The 10th anniversary of Mr Putin’s first appointment as prime minister is as good an occasion as any to announce that during the past decade Russia has managed to quarrel with the whole world and put itself in total isolation.


PARTY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
August has not yet brought any major upheavals, so stern critics of Russia have to make do with anniversaries and their analysis, which is a poor substitute for actual catastrophes. However, if stamped paper is not available, one writes on ordinary paper. The 10th anniversary of Mr Putin's first appointment as prime minister is as good an occasion as any to announce that during the past decade Russia has managed to quarrel with the whole world and put itself in total isolation.

It seems there is not real need to prove this claim, either by analyzing the present state of affairs (i.e. how bad Russia's relations are with Germany or, say, China) or comparing the present situation with the past (i.e. where Russia was in 1999 and where it is now). All it takes is to mechanically repeat the thesis until it comes to be taken for granted and no one asks for the brackets to be opened.

And yet, why not open the brackets and start the count?

The relations with Japan have for many years stalled over the problem of the Kuril Islands. Vladimir Putin has not changed the situation one way or the other. Nobody has noticed a worsening of relations with China, India, Iran and Latin America. In fact, the reverse is true. As for Western powers, notably the United States, it is worth remembering that in 1999 Russia was described as a failed state and there was open talk about introducing external management. In the summer of 1999, it was enough to open any Western newspaper to see that Russia-bashing was a favourite pastime. Given this reference point one wonders how things could have been made worse, unless one considers the scrapping of the idea of introducing external rule to be a change for the worse.

Speaking about the post-Soviet space with regard to which the thesis about an overall deterioration is belaboured, it is worth looking at all the republics one by one. The relations with the Central Asian tyrannies fluctuated within the limits of a statistical error. Turkmenistan was and remains a hermit; in Kyrgyzstan a week despot, Askar Akayev, has been replaced with a stronger one, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which made little difference to its relationship with Russia. The relations with the most enlightened and reasonable leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, have always been even and satisfactory, and there is no reason for claiming that the relations with the Tajik and Uzbek tyrannies have worsened. If there has been any change it too has been within the limits of a statistical error.

In the Caucasus the relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia have been stable. True, the relations with Georgia have been broken off, but then Georgia does not amount to the whole post-Soviet space. The relations with Moldova have been spotty, but one can hardly claim that they have grown worse in comparison with the far-from-ideal 1990s.

There were serious frictions with Ukraine even under Leonid Kuchma, but the then Ukrainian President was more skilful in making a balancing act and was mindful of Russian gas subsidies. President Yushchenko rejected the balancing act and embarked on the European road. The results are well known. That said, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship is not as hopeless as the one with Georgia. The pro-European Yushchenko is a political corpse while the contenders for his seat are more supportive of Kuchma's policy of trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

The Belarusian ally with his Punic loyalty is as restive today as he was during Yeltsin's times. It would be a big stretch to imagine that in the 1990s the words casus foedris (a situation in which the terms of a treaty must be activated) made Alexander Lukashenko want to lay down his life for Russia, but now Vladimir Putin has spoiled everything.

The relations with the Baltic states became frosty immediately after 1991 and have never warmed since. The reason is simple: having won freedom and quickly discovering that nobody really needed them the Balts started trading their only sellable resource declaring themselves to be Europe's outpost protecting it from the Darkness coming from the east. Had Russia's President been not Putin, but Kasyanov and even Kasparov, the Balts would still be making the same pitch.

Arguably, the only change in Russia's foreign policy has been the tendency to call things by their real names. In the 1990s things were not called by their true names, but it did not make things any better. It probably made them even worse.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board.

Maxim Sokolov