Vedomosti: "Modernization: An alternative to the vertical power structure"
As the crisis in Russia spreads and deepens discussions on how to cope with it become more complicated. They put on the agenda not only the issue of oil prices, but the quality of government, the whole social and political setup in this country. It is becoming clear that no breakthrough can be achieved in dealing with social issues without innovative economic growth, which in turn is impossible without creating a favourable institutional environment for private initiative, without a competitive political system, a free media, etc. Therefore the agenda of inevitable reforms is vast and, most importantly, spans all sectors.
This banal conclusion prompts the question that may not be so banal: who is going to design the agenda and, even more importantly, to implement it? Everybody, by inertia, looks to the state which is supposed to assume these functions. But can a corrupt and demoralised bureaucratic machine reorganize itself even if the two rulers want it to? Vladimir Putin's efforts (think of his impassioned pleas made in the addresses to the Federal Assembly) and those of Dmitry Medvedev who declared war on corruption and lawlessness, have brought no results.
There are several ways out of this situation.
First: to do nothing in the hope that things will take care of themselves. The hope is that the prices of oil, gas and metals will soar. The main problem is how to weather these troubled times. Politically it is not such a bad scenario: it is the hope of most of our population who still trust Vladimir Putin as the "rain maker." But what if it does not work? Miracles happen rarely and Russia has already had its share of miracles in recent years in the shape of windfall oil profits.
The second scenario is to tighten the screws. The idea has been in the air and politically can be sold to the populace. There are more than enough pretexts for launching this scenario. Another armed conflict with Georgia or a high-profile terrorist attack in the North Caucasus would suit just fine. The media would report "enemies on our doorstep." That would be reason enough to curtail the social programmes and the remaining freedoms, such as free access to the internet, freedom of movement across frontiers and the existence of several uncensored media outlets. One cannot rule out temporary detention without charges of some dissidents. This was already practiced more than once with regard to the activists who organized the marches "of those who disagree." As for the flabby power structures, the federal and local governments would be put on a military footing with preemptive punishment of miscreants. This should go down well with the population, especially since the casualties may be government ministers and governors. Business will be run directly by the state: think of the extensive experience of dictatorships in Europe and Latin America in the last century. Again, the popular masses would welcome it. But what next?
Most probably international isolation, shrinking exports and imports, fixed prices and inevitable introduction of rationing, the creation of a "labour front" modelled on the fascist regimes (the idea is already being promoted by some "experts"). Within years and even months (and against the wishes of the people who would launch such a course of events) a country similar to Cuba (at best), Myanmar or even North Korea would appear on the world map.
Do those who have their hand on the control switch understand that this is a possibility? We have an example of such a switch before our eyes: Mikhail Gorbachev, who launched perestroika, never expected that it would lead to the breakup of the USSR.
Finally there is a third way out: modernisation in an attempt to enter the 21st century together with the civilized world. This can follow two trajectories: a revolutionary and an evolutionary one. In other words, reforms from the bottom up or from top down.
I believe that to continue to do nothing or to tighten the screws is a recipe for revolutionary upheavals. Whatever might be said about the patience and spirituality of our people, when the shops are empty and wages and pensions turn into worthless scraps of paper the instinct of self-preservation will force people to revolt. Of course, such a scenario should be avoided.
The evolutionary path of modernisation is the most complicated. Our bureaucracy dampens all the messages that are sent from the top. Besides, the fact that the coming reforms are so closely intertwined is in stark contrast with the fact that the bureaucracy is divided on sectoral and regional lines. A classical example: the Healthcare and Social Development Ministry is supposed to administer the pension system, but the Ministry is not interested in what happens to the accumulated part of the pension as it is under the jurisdiction of the Economic Development Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Federal Securities Market Service and the Pension Fund. Truly, too many cooks spoil the broth. Everybody remembers the experience of crossing boundaries between regions by car: the road becomes suddenly worse or better. It is the same everywhere.
What does the ruling duo have to do if it decides to initiate reforms from the top? What could be its social base? United Russia? But this is the case of which Lenin used to say that the wall is rotten and you only have to push it and it will fall. Can they rely on "civil society?" The answer is the same. The government and pro-government spin doctors have done a terrific job on Russia.
The only remaining option is to build parallel structures. Peter I was unable to modernize the Streltsy militias and started creating a regular modern army from scratch, grafting onto the Russian soil even minor details of uniforms such as sausage curls. Peter I did not even try to turn Moscow into a European capital, preferring to build St Petersburg on marshlands in the Neva River area.
Fast-forward to the 20th century. Vladimir Putin, would-be president of Russia, initiated the creation of the Strategic Studies Centre in late 1999 charging it with developing a comprehensive reform programme. The meetings and roundtables staged by that non-governmental organization were diligently attended by ministers and even deputy prime ministers. Work was in full swing, but no matter how hard German Gref, Elvira Nabiullina, Dmitry Mezentsev and Arkady Dvorkovich were working the reform programme they prepared remained largely on paper. I think this happened because Putin never came to properly overseeing the work of the Centre. Although the people mentioned above have been promoted to high posts, what was lacking to make the reforms a success was administrative resources blended with political will.
What can be done today? A parallel centre for preparing the presidential and government decisions must be created. Like in the case of the Strategic Studies Centre, it could be a non-governmental outfit. Its founders could be the most authoritative research centres and people who have not tarnished their reputations by being complicit in bringing the country to its present sorry state. Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin could become the co-chairs of a supervisory council of that structure. But the key issue is the scope of authority. This new institution could, first, be charged with preparing a reform plan, including the sequence of concrete steps and second, be allowed (for example, by Dmitry Medvedev's decree) to scrutinise all the proposed decisions of the government and the president and even to sign (or not sign) the corresponding documents; and thirdly, it could be given powers to monitor the execution of decisions with regular analytical reports to the very top.
Naturally, such an institution should become the centre of social and intellectual life, organising daily roundtables, seminars and conferences and using state-of-the-art information technologies. The state leaders would be directly involved in the work of that institution regarding it as an informal but essential unit of the president's administration and the government.
At this point I would perhaps suspend my flight of fancy because further description of the work of that institution only makes sense if a decision is taken in principle to create it. Only a trifle remains: to combine the available and even excessive administrative resource with a powerful political will for reform.
Yevgeny Gontmakher, member of the board of the Institute of Contemporary Development
