Evolution from agonizing separatism to mythical state.
On August 9, 1999, Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister of Russia. At the time, it was difficult to imagine that the new prime minister, who later became president, would gain such enormous popularity in Russia and abroad, and that his approval ratings would even withstand the economic crisis. The Putin phenomenon, as studied by the most authoritative researchers, is largely based on two things: favorable historical circumstances and an outstanding intuition, which allows the prime minister to accurately gauge voter mood. At the same time, the analysts also point out the weakness in the system as created during the last ten years.
The prime minister's image, however, is designed to redress and even eliminate this negative factor. Putin obviously has a talent to look sincere in any situation, tell impromptu stories and politically incorrect jokes, and interact with people in a very moving way, almost as well as an accomplished actor. A recent episode, in which the prime minister gave his watch away to a shepherd boy, is a case to the point.
Putin always gives the impression that he is in control. He readily displays his physical fitness and always wants to appear close to the common people. If he communicates with the youth at lake Seliger, he makes sure to do it in person and not on TV, if he goes fishing, he does not mind being seen with a naked torso.
At the same time, according to the Nezavisimaya Gazeta analysts, the country's elite have undergone a serious transformation under Putin's leadership. And these changes have been evolutionary. "This was not a revolution, however, there were no imprisonments or any kind of mass purges, says Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Centre for Elite Research, Sociology Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences.
During the first two years, 25 percent of the country's higher bureaucracy was replaced, "and this was done in a very delicate manner," Kryshtanovskaya says. Most importantly, managers from security agencies, the siloviki, were brought into the government, which is understandable, in view of Putin's goal to ensure law and order in the country, explains Kryshtanovskaya.
For the silovoki, however, the new responsibilities proved to be quite challenging, as now they found themselves beyond their traditional "competence zone," entering the socio-political, cultural, and economic spheres, where they lacked proficiency. This was very stressful for them, and they had to learn a lot quickly. Putin himself had to learn many things."
As a result, the siloviki "came to perceive themselves as messiahs, saviours, and true patriots, entrusted by the country with a special mission. This was probably the most significant transformation of elites, which took place under Putin's rule," Kryshtanovskaya says.
According to Kryshtanovskaya, the prime minister is the bearer of a new ideology consisting of some combination of both the left and the right, and herein lies the essence of his phenomenon. "He is the first neo-conservative leader; he has found a style of his own, both in politics and in economics."
Under Putin, the Yeltsin oligarchy either disappeared or transformed itself by becoming more modest and reticent. Of course, new interest groups have emerged and state corporations have been established. They represent Putin's new elite. His support base includes not only the government bureaucracy and the siloviki, but also a segment of the upper bourgeoisie, which has emerged as a result of his efforts to strengthen the public sector of the economy."
According to Nikolai Petrov, at the Moscow Carnegie Centre Research Council, the internal and external economic environment of the late 1990s played into Putin's hand. At that time, the prices for metals and energy resources jumped up abruptly, significantly strengthening Russia's position as an exporter. Domestically, the 1998 economic crisis proved to have a positive effect on the country's economy.
At the same time, Petrov says, there was no effective system of checks and balances - "institutions that could limit or channel Putin's power and energy; Putin rose in the ranks too fast from a department head to the nation's president, which resulted in a "decompression illness" of sorts.
The enormous popularity that Putin enjoyed at the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 also had an impact on his policies, "by preventing him from implementing risky reforms and undertaking drastic measures that could undermine his popularity," Petrov says.
The analyst distinguishes two periods during Putin's ten-year rule. "His first presidential term was relatively successful, as the system, established toward the end of the term that blocked all development prospects, was not in place yet. A series of reforms were implemented during that time, and the system was relatively open. The president was active and engaged in various areas of activity. The primary motivation behind Putin's second term was the desire to stay in power or arrange for a power transition in such a way that he would remain in control."
As a result, Putin has found himself in a precarious situation. "He was hoping to become a ‘ceremonial' prime minister in terms of dealing with day-to-day government activities, and allocating financial resources in a time of tremendous economic prosperity. As it turned out, however, instead of "ceremonial" functions, he is forced to take a hands-on role as the head of the government, which he did not plan for and which burdens him. Ultimately, it is now that Putin's place in history is being determined, and the judgment has yet to be made."
Alexei Malashenko, also with the Carnegie Centre, says that Putin was lucky. "First, he inherited a post-crisis Russia. Second, he inherited a separatist movement, which was agonizing, despite the 1999 events. Then we have the policies that he is personally responsible for - the extreme centralization of power, and the obvious trend toward a unitary state...We are gradually becoming a mythic state again.
Specifically, a myth was created about Russia being an "energy power," which eventually had to be discarded. Another myth was created about a "sovereign democracy." As a result, we have a centralized power structure, in which political institutions and parties not only have very limited influence, but also have been relegated to completely secondary roles."
Alexandra Samarina