Is it possible that Russia, by its very nature, simply cannot be integrated into the international community as part of a "greater Europe?" Is it rejected in Europe as a matter of sheer principle, or simply because the country's leaders are not acceptable there? Fyodor Lukyanov sheds some light on this question in his article by analysing the history of Russia's relations with the world under Vladimir Putin's watch, from the initial rapprochement with the West to all the subsequent frustration and confrontation. In the 1990s, it was customary to say that the West "lost Russia". Today, it is more common to hear the claim that Moscow's policies have driven the US and Europe away from Russia. So, who exactly has "lost" whom?
The first thing that comes to mind is Putin's famous phone call to George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, as well as the closing of Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. "The game that Putin played at the beginning of his first presidential term was called "partnership", Robert Skidelsky wrote in his Vedomosti article. "But the return on investment in the "partnership" proved to be negligible." Skidelsky maintained that in 2002, Russia even went so far as to inquire about possible NATO membership. "NATO does not invite nations to join. If interested, they should file a membership application", was the informal response to the informal Russian inquiry. "Russia will not stand in line," Putin said (Tochka Nevozvrata (the point of no return), Vedomosti dated 22.02.2007). As it happened, Russia was not accepted as an equal. Then came the colour revolutions, followed by the gas wars. In the end, the positive attitude changed and the last remnants of mutual trust completely dried up. Finally, in February 2007, Putin delivered his Munich speech and openly lambasted the US and Europe.
In the article The Putin Paradox, the author provides an excellent analysis of the last 10 years of Russian foreign policy and poses a challenging question: what comes first, Putin's policy, which causes rejection abroad, or the external environment that compels the Russian leader to take certain actions? According to Lukyanov, there is no clear-cut, unequivocal answer to this question.
Still, one can't help but ask the "childish" question - what if a different politician, one much more acceptable to the leading western powers, was in Putin's place? Would relations have taken a different course? Would there have been fewer reasons for disappointment? And there would have been no gas wars and the war with Georgia would have been avoided? Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov, for one, had real chances to be in Putin's place. Would Russia have been treated as an equal with them at the helm? Or, what if by some unimaginable set of circumstances Anatoly Chubays or Yegor Gaidar had become the leaders? Would Russia have been welcomed into the WTO and the OECD, invited to annual meetings in Davos, taken part in the united fight against terrorism, won the Nobel Peace Prize, and carried out a joint mission to Mars?
If, on the other hand, it really has nothing to do with individual leaders, does this mean, then, that Russia is inherently deficient and incapable of becoming a part of a "greater Europe?" In the long run, a big country that is not treated equally will inevitably strive to become a power centre in its own right, all the while clearly overestimating its own capabilities and condemning itself to political isolation. It is not quite as sad, as it is expensive...
Maksim Trudolyubov