I have always believed that a double-headed vertical power structure is the best of all possible options for Russia, if only because this model lends a new quality to political life.
In the past, periods when there were two power centres were thought to be somehow abnormal, and were described as "dual power": the centres vied with each other for absolute power, while the country and society lacked government and descended into chaos. Everybody instinctively felt that somehow only an absolute autocracy could rule Russia. This was the case in 1917, when the dual power of the Provisional Government and the Soviets ended with the storming of the Winter Palace; and again in 1991, when presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, one of the USSR and one of Russia, competed until one of them emerged victorious. As a result, power fell into Yeltsin's hands, and the USSR ceased to exist as a state. In 1993, Yeltsin faced Khasbulatov, the President with the Supreme Soviet. The outcome is well known: the Supreme Soviet was dissolved and the Parliament building shelled.
This is not to say that the parties did not seek a compromise. At least they claimed they wanted one. But the compromise failed. The reason for the failure stemmed from a fundamental assumption concerning the nature of the state and how it operates. Tell me who is the boss and I will obey him. I cannot obey two bosses at the same time! The idea of separating government so that one part of it operates under one boss in order to address one set of problems, and the other under another boss with a different set of problems somehow did not seem to fit into the definition of the state.
The Medvedev-Putin tandem, we want to believe, is socially and culturally different. This is not dual power, but nor is it the full separation of powers. That Medvedev and Putin have coexisted for a whole year is very positive. The longer they coexist, the better. Political elites and ordinary people are gradually realising that, in principle, two centres of power can coexist. There need not be a political tug-of-war; responsibility and power can be divided in a relatively peaceful way. This is a different logic of behaviour: not "either or", but "both".
The President has his set of duties and powers, and the Prime Minister has his. They may not be terribly fond of each other, they may compete and be jealous, but neither is strong enough or has enough resources and social support to bring the situation back to a one-centre alternative, if only because such a turn of events would be seen by the people, the elites and the outside world as usurpation and breaking the rules. Of course, running the country from one centre is easier from a political perspective. But strategically limiting political competition makes the system less flexible and less capable of evolving. Moreover, such a strategy is more trouble than it is worth. The establishment has realised that it can be wealthier and safer when there is a separation of powers.
I think the change is irreversible.
It is clear that the tandem will be seriously tested. In light of the financial crisis, somebody will have to be held responsible for all the hardships. Neither Putin nor Medvedev wants to answer. This gives rise to negative competition, or in other words, competition to avoid becoming the scapegoat. But there is also positive competition for who will emerge as the saviour. A portion of the elite believes that the financial crisis should be dealt with a Stalinist approach, meaning through harsh state control and the confiscation of assets. Another part believes that the investment climate must be improved, private investments attracted, etc. Advocates on both sides are putting pressure on the President's camp and on the Prime Minister's camp. Sooner or later, a choice will have to be made. It cannot be guaranteed that the decision will be the same in the Kremlin and in the Government House.
There are also personal elements. On the one hand, Mr Putin has elevated Medvedev to power, and probably expects the President to take cues from him. On the other hand, Medvedev is not naïve, and he does not look forward to the prospect of being an understudy all his life. Over the past year, he has acquired experience and is sending clear signals: I am not temporarily fulfilling an obligation, I have my own priorities and my own style. He is taking judicious steps to strengthen his position and looking for new bases of support. Hence his restrained half-bow towards the democratic alternative. It's nothing personal, it's sheer logic: if you do not want to be a leader, there is no point in going into politics.
Consequently, conflicts are inevitable. The main thing is that they do not go beyond the boundaries set up by the concept of separation of powers. This is a considerable change in post-Soviet political culture. Faced with the question of what is more important, unlimited power or the agreed-upon rules of the game, the culture answers for the first time that the rules are more important. Sounds strange, doesn't it?
Dmitry Oreshkin is a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society Institution Development and Human Rights.
By Dmitry Oreshkin