Transcript of the broadcast on April 17, 2009.
Signals, decoding
Topic.
Analogue signals.
It will soon be a year since Dmitry Medvedev became President. Those who remember Mikhail Gorbachev's first year as the Communist Party General Secretary would agree that history repeats itself. Mr Gorbachev looked more liberal than his predecessors. There were hopes for a "thaw". However, everybody was sure that Gorbachev was beholden to the Kremlin octogenarians. Gorbachev's first year fell on the first year of plummeting oil prices and he realised that he could not afford a confrontation with the West. Like today, a "reset" of relations with America took place.
A week ago The New York Times published a hard-hitting editorial claiming that Dmitry Medvedev has not yet asserted himself as the national leader and has done nothing to confirm his commitment to freedom and rule of law. One cannot help remembering that in 1987 a group of cultural personalities who had been expelled from the USSR under Brezhnev published an open letter to Mr Gorbachev in the newspaper Le Figaro challenging him to prove by his deeds that he was in favour of reform.
What Dmitry Medvedev did shortly after The New York Times article was a minor sensation. To begin with, he gave an interview to Novaya Gazeta. It will be recalled that in March 2000 Vladimir Putin indicated to the chief editors of media outlets that he would have no truck with the publications that do not support him. Second, Mr Medvedev met with the experts of the liberal Modern Development Institute and, what is more, rather than inviting them to the Kremlin he went to the Institute's headquarters. Thirdly, he met with the members of the Presidential Human Rights Council, which was recently joined by avowed critics of the establishment.
Experts are looking for signs of imminent change. Giving signals to urbi et orbi is all very well. But these are words. We want to see deeds.
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Winners and losers
The week's main winner is Ramzan Kadyrov
An official end has been called to the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya. True, it happened later than Mr Kadyrov had expected: when the Chechen President announced the Kremlin decision he was told that, after all, making such announcements was the prerogative of the country's leaders.
State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov was among the losers. He said that voting against anti-crisis measures was a challenge to political stability on the part of the opposition. The Communists retorted that the whole point of the opposition is to offer its own projects.
Fyodor Bondarchuk found himself in an ambiguous position. Presenting part 2 of "Habitable Island", he spoke about totalitarianism and complained that there was no free press in the country. Later Bondarchuk claimed to have been misunderstood before receiving a United Russia membership card from Boris Gryzlov. But it all left an aftertaste.
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Conversation with an expert: the "Putin" project is for domestic consumption and "Medvedev" is for export
Our guest today is political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky
Q.: How do you rate Boris Nemtsov's chances of winning the mayoral elections in Sochi?
A.: If it were a free and fair election I would rate his chances as fairly high. Mr Nemtsov, whatever you might say, is a star in the political firmament. One of the Russian voter's key motives is to get rid of his own provincialism, so the voter loves a star, regardless of his political views and managerial expertise. But the Kremlin will prevent Nemtsov from winning.
Q.: Why has he been registered as a candidate? Is it not in the interests of the establishment to win him over?
A.: I believe that Mr Nemtsov was registered because initially the Kremlin wanted to turn the elections of the Sochi Mayor into a fairground show by fielding several unelectable candidates. However, it then became clear that in spite of the information blackout Mr Nemtsov was gaining more and more support. Now they will make short shrift of Mr Nemtsov during the course of elections by using administrative resources. Does the Kremlin stand to gain if Nemtsov wins? If the Kremlin were guided by political logic, of which it is frequently and wrongly suspected, it would have allowed Mr Nemtsov to become the Mayor of Sochi. But the Kremlin is a business corporation with criminal mentality. Such a logic forbids allowing independent people to occupy important posts.
Q.: What do you think about the lifting of the counterterrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya?
A.: Some security officers made a feeble attempt to resist the lifting of the CTO, but they do not have enough clout. Mr Kadyrov is not just the head of a territory that is nominally a part of Russia. He is one of the key figures in federal politics with regard to whom the Kremlin and the Government have certain obligations. In addition, the lifting of the CTO regime shows that Russia had been defeated in the second Chechen War. It could not have been otherwise. The war started not as a military or a political action, but as a propaganda project whose aim was to deliver the presidency to Vladimir Putin. That goal was achieved in early 2000. The Kremlin was casting about for some Chechen clan that would assume responsibility for Chechnya and eventually made a deal with Kadyrov.
Q.: What are the President's and the Government's obligations to Kadyrov?
A.: Virtual independence of Chechnya in exchange for Chechnya remaining formally part of Russia and displaying loyalty to the Kremlin. Grozny will have an international airport and its own customs office. I think Chechnya will soon become an importer's paradise, a new offshore zone. It will drain billions of roubles from the federal budget.
Q.: How do you assess the performance of the governors and the federal Government in combating the crisis?
A.: The authorities have no anti-crisis strategy. The ruling elite in modern Russia is an elite of time-servers. The price of oil determines the development of the economy for the elite, including its opposition section. We hear no ideas on economic development. The governors of course are well aware of how grave the situation is. But the Government - at least its head - have a poor grasp of the situation.
Q.: Why does Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin repeatedly make pessimistic forecasts that contrast with the statements of other high-ranking officials?
A.: Apparently the Minister understands well what is happening. Besides, he is not seeking any office and his reputation is more important for him than the political fallout from his statements. Perhaps Mr Kudrin is trying to absolve himself and the Government of the responsibility for the consequences of the crisis. And then there is the rule of all the apparatchiks: exaggerate the gloom and then you will claim the credit for any success.
Q.: How do you read President Medvedev's recent actions (meetings with human rights activists, an interview with Novaya Gazeta and so on)?
A.: Everything the Russian President does sends some signal. But I wouldn't read too much into what happened. Project "Putin" was intended mainly for internal consumption, its aim was to make up for the deficit of legitimacy of power which plagued the elite in the Yeltsin era. Dmitry Medvedev is for foreign consumption. His task is to create conditions for the legitimisation of the Russian elite in the West.
Q.: What do you think about the suggestions that Mr Medvedev may dissolve the Government? Who could become the Prime Minister instead of Mr Putin?
A.: There is nothing to prevent Mr Medvedev from signing such a decree other than the personal relationship between him and the Prime Minister. I don't think that Mr Medvedev would like to be perceived as an ungrateful person. But if Mr Putin were to be sacked, people would start forgetting him fast. As the Prime Minister he does not play any significant role, he is not involved in working out anti-crisis measures. In fact, Mr Putin is a talking head with little authentic information about what is happening. The problem is not Vladimir Putin but the fact that there is no strong personality today who, after replacing Putin, would dramatically change policy and pass on from patching up of holes to working out a new economic model and development strategy.