The former Georgian leader says resignation may be the crucial point in a politician's career.
Q.: Mr Shevardnadze, why did you quit in 2003?
A.: It was a matter of a political leader's responsibility. I had two options. I was still President and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. I could have ordered the Army to crack down on the protesters. There was a day when I said: "What is happening in Georgia is a coup d'etat attempt" and I signed an order introducing a state of emergency. At the same time I was aware that blood could be spilled. That was too big a price. On that same evening on my way home to my residence I called the government office and repealed my executive order. When I came home my wife told me: "I hear you are introducing a state of emergency. Do you want blood to be shed?" To which I replied: "There will be no bloodshed. As of tomorrow I am no longer the President"...
On the second day I called in the opposition leaders, Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili. I asked them: "Guys, what are we going to do?" Mr Zhvania said: "The least painful way out would be for the President to resign. But you have brought us up and fostered us as politicians and we would not dare to urge you to do it". Mr Saakashvili said the same. And then I told them: "Guys, I made the decision to resign yesterday evening." They had not expected such a reaction. They thought I would start bargaining.
Q.: Perhaps it would have been better if you had served out your term? That way, transition of power in Georgia would have taken place not through a coup, but more calmly.
A.: I still think my political decision was correct. This was the choice before me: either to resign or to unleash bloodshed...
Q.: Today the same demands are put to Saakashvili. How do you think he should act?
A.: Journalists constantly ask me that question and I always reply: if I were in Saakashvili's place, I would go. The situation is deteriorating. The number of protesters is growing, their demands are becoming more and more radical and the opposition is turning into an organized force.
Q.: What were Mr Saakashvili's biggest mistakes?
A.: To my mind, his biggest mistakes were dispersing the rally on November 7, 2007 and shutting down Imedi television channel. And also moving troops into Tskhinvali. That decision was Georgia's undoing. True, the Russian leadership also had a hand in it. The Russian authorities committed perhaps an even more dreadful error by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Q.: Does Georgia have a chance to reclaim Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
A.: I am sure the time will come when we will come to terms with our Abkhaz and Ossetian brothers and these historically Georgian lands will be recovered. But that is not all. I have said more than once that Russia committed a gross political error when it recognized the independence of these small regions. It prompts the question: why can't Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan become independent? These regions have populations of hundreds of thousands and even millions. They are independent and viable regions economically. In other words, Russia has set a precedent that is unacceptable for Russia itself. Precedent is very important in politics. Mark my word.
Q.: Mr Shevardnadze, who made the decisions in August of last year is no secret. Why did you manage to contain Mr Putin's aggressive policy while Mikheil Saakashvili failed to do so?
A.: We were friends with Putin. I managed to pursue a subtle and far-sighted policy vis-à-vis the US and simultaneously to be friends with Russia. When the Americans decided to help Georgia to train regular armed forces and border troops, which cost a lot of money, we had just joined the CIS. The CIS meeting was taking place in Alma-Ata. On the eve of the meeting I called on Putin and said that we had decided to enlist American help in building up a Georgian Army. Mr Putin looked a little embarrassed and said: "We would have helped too." I replied: "You don't have that much money. But I give you my word that there will never be on Georgian territory American military bases or those of any other countries that may pose a danger to Russia."
Then we gave a press conference after the meeting during which Mr Putin reported as Chairman of the CIS. One journalist asked him, "What do you think about Georgia's decision to allow the Americans to train its regular army and border guards?" Mr Putin replied that Georgia was an independent state and was free to choose its allies.
We had one more meeting with Vladimir Putin. In March 2003, he was on a holiday in Sochi, he called me: "I am alone here, come over and we can have a ten-day holiday together". I agreed. He had just one thing to ask me. There was a railway between Sochi and Sukhumi. The distance is so short that you could cover it faster on horseback than by train. And robberies happened there all the time. Mr Putin asked for permission to continue building the road from Sukhumi to the Samtredia railway hub. Then Russia would have rail links with Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi. I agreed. But I asked something in return. I asked him to allow Georgian refugees to return to the Gali district in Abkhazia. In my presence Mr Putin called the commander of the peacekeeping forces and ordered him to ensure the return of the refugees within 2-3 days. At the time 65,000-70,000 people returned home. We had no more meetings with Mr Putin.
Q.: You said that you consider your decision to resign in November 2003 your biggest political achievement. But I think that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War were much more important events.
A.: When I quit in November 2003 I received a letter from George Bush Jr. In the letter he listed my services. First, the unification of Germany. Second, mending fences between the Soviet Union and America. Third, reduction and destruction of both American and Soviet nuclear weapons. But, Mr Bush wrote, the most important move is "your dignified resignation" and the fact that I voluntarily handed over power to my political disciples. So that was the letter and I think it is perfectly objective.
Q.: In your time you managed to change the world and make it more open. Isn't the reverse happening today?
A.: It has been happening. But with the election of the new American President, Barack Obama, I think these negative processes will stop. I pin great hopes on him. He is a very free and educated man and he is not risk-averse. I hope he will put the relations with Iran and Russia on an even keel.
Q.: Do you find the new Russian President promising?
A.: I think that there have been significant changes in the Russian leadership after the war in South Ossetia. And the fact that they are making categorical statements, for example, Mr Medvedev says he will not talk to Saakashvili, I think he is saying it on an impulse. Mr Saakashvili has made many mistakes, but the Russian authorities should not make similar mistakes.
Q.: When Saakashvili came to power there was a strong sense in Russia that all Georgia's decisions were made for it by the West. What do you think about it?
A.: I told Putin that there would be no American bases in Georgia, and there are none. By the way, Russia at the time made a reasonable decision to withdraw all Russian bases from Georgia. Vladimir Putin made that decision at my insistence. The biggest base was in Akhalkalaki.
Q.: Tell me please, when these young people whom you have brought up came to power...
A.: I didn't bring them up in the right way.
Q.: Do you take the blame as a mentor?
A.: Some pupils can be educated. There are those who seem to be doing well, but still make many mistakes later.
Q.: Did your pupils who have come to power ever seek your advice?
A.: Neither Saakashvili, nor the current Government nor the opposition have ever come to me for advice.
"If I were in Saakashvili's place I would resign"
Yelena Milashina
