Social contracts - real and not
Jean-Jacques Rousseau posed a question some 250 years ago: Is law based governance possible and reliable? The philosopher could not give an unequivocal answer to his question. The principle of "social contract" that he formulated was a rather abstract concept. In recent months, Russian analysts, following Lenin's methodology, have been quickly moving from the abstract to something more real. The new social contract for Russia is discussed by Yevgeny Gontmakher and Alexander Auzan, Andrei Kolesnikov and Andrei Piontkovsky. The declared objective is extremely ambitious - to re-constitute Russia.
The contract that never was
The mentioned analysts as well as some others differ considerably in their positions, but they also share a common premise. The contract between society and the Government that on behalf of the latter was concluded by Vladimir Putin, was based on a simple exchange - to ignore the growing limitations on civil and political rights and freedoms in exchange for economic prosperity.
Now, under conditions of the growing economic downturn, this contract is no longer valid. A new contract should be drawn with participation of all social forces, including the radical opposition. A direct analogy for this would be the Moncloa Pact in Spain. "Allegedly, the Government was distributing oil profits and feeding everyone; society, in exchange, partially abandoned its rights and freedoms. So, now, when the oil profits are no more, people have awaken and began demanding their freedoms," Deputy Chief of Staff of the President's Executive Office Vladislav Surkov described with sarcasm this line of thinking.
In reality, however, there has never been a "money in exchange for freedom" contract. What political programme did Unity and its (then) informal leader Vladimir Putin have during the 1999 elections? What did Mr Putin promise in his policy statement article, published on December 30, 1999? He promised order, stability, hope, and future.
Putin's contract with society was an adequate response to the public demand of the time - the demand for order. It was shaped during the war in Chechnya and amongst terror. Subsequently, Putin has always relied on the opinion of the majority of people and adjusted his policies based on the majority's new demands, including the social ones. "Freedom has a material dimension, and the Government has been increasing the people's well-being in recent years not to exchange it for their freedom, but to make them free," Mr Surkov believes. In addition, as a political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin once said: "In Russia, people do not vote with their money."
A vertical contract
Mr Putin relied on an old tradition considering that the Grand Social Contract (if we may call it that way) was concluded on the eve of the sovereign Russian state.
The state has always played the main and dominant role in any social contracts in Russia. Many factors have contributed to this "vertical" type of contract (as opposed to a "horizontal" contract concluded through agreement among all classes and social groups) - the desolate vastness of the Great Steppe demanded a bonded serving class as opposed to free nobility; the Mongol governance heritage; constant centuries-long wars with the Horde and Lithuania for a "spot on the map" followed by responses to possible other military threats; the weakness of cities and absence of communal revolutions. Social classes have always demanded that the state should first of all protect, defend, and ensure order.
A "vertical contract" (just as its successor - the "Putin contract") is far from being flawless. A possible "liberal" alternative is much worse, however. A weakening or break-down of power in Russia has never led to a "new contract," described by Rousseau, or transition to a "horizontal" model favoured by the West, but has always resulted in immediate collapse of political and social institutions, as well as social interactions.
The examples are: the Time of Troubles, the February Revolution, and the collapse of the USSR.
A new round
Now, just as in the late 80-s, they want us to sit down at the negotiating table and, disregarding the experience of 2000-s and another 500 years of history, to sign some kind of contract. Who will sign it? Why? What for?
Here is what Alexei Kondaurov, one of the shadow activists of the radical opposition, says. "It is necessary to move on from abstract discussions on the ‘inevitable collapse of the regime', to ultimate conviction that only Kasyanov, Kasparov, Limonov, and other opposition leaders can shoulder the burden of historical responsibility for Russia."
Why these three individuals? Why not Zyuganov, Mironov, and Zhrinovsky, for example? After all, they do have rather significant popular support, in addition to party apparatus and parliamentary membership. Why not Kovalyev, Alexeyeva, and Novodvorskaya; does not the nation trust human rights advocates? Why not Luzhkov, Primakov, and Chernomyrdin - the "heavy-weights" of Russian politics?
It is, of course, possible to sit down at the negotiating table with each of these groupings or with all of them. However, any document, signed by these individuals or any others for that matter, will hardly be authoritative, let alone legitimate.
Why do we need a "mythical" contract, if we already have an absolutely legitimate Constitution, a President elected by popular vote, and regular elections at all levels of government? Why do we need it, if our national democratic institutions are well functioning and we have even developed a national model of democracy? True, the freedom of elections is periodically challenged, but this is a matter of a district court rather than the court of history.
Besides, social contracts do not emerge out of blue. When a totalitarian system breaks down, the chaos that emerges in its place has to be dealt with, and the largest political forces sit down at the negotiating table. This was the case with the Moncloa Pact. Today, Russia does not face such challenges and will not face them in the near future.
The existing contract
Mr Surkov is right when he says that the existing political system in Russia is functioning well and there is no need to revise it. "One should not create an impression that because of some economic setbacks, we need to change the system." We should add here - the system is capable of development, it has a development potential, and it is in fact developing. President Dmitry Medvedev's political programme, laid out in his address to the Federal Assembly and the emergence of the the Right Cause party are a clear indication of this fact.
Of course, nothing is permanent under the sun. We have an institution of elections - presidential, parliamentary, and regional. Why not convince the electorate that the existing model is ineffective and propose your own? If you win the majority, then a new social contract between society and the Government may emerge. This, however, is a lengthy process.
Our global thinkers have something else in mind - to gather 10 (15, 20, 50) individuals and "reconstitute" the system by signing some kind of document, disregarding the will of the people. We have already witnessed this in the 90s, when through agreements with various elite groups, the Government was able to solve tactical problems. As a result, however, the people's trust in the Government and the political system was undermined for a long time.
The "Putin contract" is active. President Medvedev has openly confirmed it. "Our priorities for the next... 15-20 years were revealed eight years ago, and since then the Russian Federation development goals have not changed..."
This contract is sealed by the will of millions of Russians, who voted for Mr Putin in 2000 and 2004 and for Mr Medvedev in 2008; and who currently support the governing tandem and the policies of United Russia. It can hardly be broken by several second or even fourth tier politicians, who may gather around a table, even a negotiating one.
Dmitry Orlov, Ph.D History, General Director, Agency for Political and Economic Communications
Dmitry Orlov