In spite of the crisis Vladimir Putin is preparing a bridgehead for a new ideological and political war on Ukraine.
During a meeting with miners Prime Minister Putin made a slip of the tongue. Speaking about Ukraine he said that Gazprom did not intend to penalise a neighbour who is "facing default" for failing to take off all the gas contracted for because "one does not kick a partner who is down". What he said was new both from the point of view of the Russian language and traditional morality. You "do not kick an enemy who is down". As for "partner" you normally "support a partner", "don't leave a partner in need", "agree" with him or "warn" or at worst "break up" with a partner. The expression "kick a partner who is down" is almost an oxymoron which describes a very peculiar type of business relations.
It also has to be noted that the phrase reads differently in the Russian and Ukrainian political contexts. In Russia the emphasis obviously is on "kick". The man in the street weaned on the official media is likely to welcome the indication of the plight to which Ukraine has been brought by its "orange" authorities and the notion that things in Russia are still not quite as bad. He would be pleased to know that Russia has triumphed in the gas conflict over the foolhardy transit brothers and especially the hint that we can "kick" the partner if the need arises.
In the Ukrainian political context the emphasis is on the word "partner": if Russia demanded from Ukraine payment for the gas it had not used, it would vindicate Viktor Yushchenko, who claims that Yulia Tymoshenko had concluded a losing contract with Moscow. In Ukraine the "Kiev Princess" is regarded as Vladimir Putin's partner and the lifting of demand for fines is seen as a move to help her get out of the delicate situation and turn the tables against her opponents. If the sanctions are not used with regard to gas supplies in the early months of 2009 when its contract price is high, the average annual price may turn out to be acceptable to Ukraine. And that would make the contract a feather in Tymoshenko's cap.
The notorious contract is a veritable artefact of Russian-Ukrainian political relations in the early 21st century. To begin with, its full content is unknown perhaps even to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who had to send national security men to get the text, apparently without success.
Besides, judging by the details of the contract that have been leaked by various persons it has been drawn up in such a way that all the three parties - Prime Minister Putin, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko - could interpret it each in their own way. When it was signed, all the three parties were well aware that Ukraine had been stocking up on gas as early as the autumn so as not to buy it from Russia in winter when the price would be high. The contract says that Ukraine undertakes to pay for the entire volume of gas regardless of its needs. But it contains a clause which says that the final volumes of gas are to be determined in the first half of 2009.
On the strength of all the above, Yulia Tymoshenko can claim that the contract is good for Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko that it is bad for Ukraine and Vladimir Putin that it is good for Russia and marks a Russian victory. Gazprom can claim that Ukraine is in breach of the contract and must pay a fine, Naftogaz that the contract has been honoured and Prime Minister Putin that Russia will not demand a fine so as not to "kick a partner who is down". That is why the original contract should on no account be unveiled to the public so as not to ruin the integrity and charm of that tawdry show.
Unlike Anglo-Saxon and continental law, in Russian-Ukrainian post-Soviet law, contracts, by a tacit agreement between the parties, are made not to be observed but to be conveniently broken. It makes no sense to present these contracts in a law court (not that anybody is going to) but they may provide a good basis for statements, claims, threats and accusations of betrayal or corruption.
To an outsider such a law system may appear to be bizarre. It is not by chance that Mr Barroso, summing up the experience of his mediation in the gas negotiations in January, remarked that he had not encountered anything like it even in Africa. For us, this system is an expression of our political culture, which puts a high premium on the ability to create a situation when it is impossible to tell the truth from untruth, legality from arbitrariness and partnership from a life-and-death struggle.
In the event one further factor needs to be taken into account. In January 2010 Ukraine will face a presidential election in which Vladimir Putin has as big a stake as Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko. He intends to play the key role in these elections. During the last presidential elections in Ukraine Vladimir Putin suffered an embarrassing setback when he became the only head of state who congratulated the loser, Yanukovych, on his victory. So he sees the upcoming elections as a chance to take revenge.
That is why damage to the business reputation and Gazprom's losses do not look like too high a price to pay for the artillery barrage preceding an offensive on the Ukrainian front. That front is likely to become the main part of Putin's ideological and political project over the next year, even in spite of the economic crisis and the mounting problems inside Russia. Moreover, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his adherence to the principle "offense is the best defence". The new "Ukrainian project" may provide him with a chance to reformat the political agenda if the internal situation deteriorates. Surely internal problems cannot outweigh the prospect of possible reunification with Ukraine (if only Left-Bank Ukraine) and recovering the Crimea.
To sum up, the emphasis in the Prime Minister's phrase, at least at the emotional level, was on the word "kick". If a partner does not surrender he is destroyed.
By Kirill Rogov
