Today marks the one-year anniversary of Dmitry Medvedev's election to the Russian presidency. Of course, there will be no lack of congratulations and expressions of loyalty from members of the political class. This is the core part of the "programme". Equally obligatory in such cases is criticism - both direct and "wrapped up" in the same congratulations. In this case, it will be meaningfully reduced to stating "disappointment" in Medvedev's first year and to deliberations about "missed opportunities" and "remaining chances".
During his election campaign and his inauguration, Mr Medvedev repeatedly said he would follow in Vladimir Putin's footsteps. What is more, Mr Medvedev and Mr Putin publicly agreed to work in tandem, with Mr Putin assuming the post of Prime Minister following the inauguration. Continuity in values, standards, and attitudes was declared to be a strategic priority.
Still, the Liberals (both "loyal" and those belonging to the opposition) literally on the day after Mr Medvedev was nominated began setting him against Mr Putin. The future president was incriminated with planning to revise his predecessor's achievements. Some doubtful talk began about a "thaw", "liberalisation", etc. Some people sincerely believed it (why they did is a question for medical specialists rather than political scientists), some hoped to "get things moving" and "muddle men's minds" and thereby get the sought-after revisions, advance their careers, and make money.
Nonetheless, statements and steps by the new President began to increasingly disappoint this public (although most voters approved of Medvedev's efforts and his popularity rating ran high throughout the year). One need only recall "peace enforcement" in Georgia and, of course, a constitutional reform coupled with reforms of the federal, electoral, and party systems. In one case he strongly demonstrated continuity in foreign policy and in the other, in domestic policy.
The five-day war and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia helped to confirm his loyalty to great-power policy, while amendments to the Constitution and political laws helped to strengthen the democratic regime established and improved between 2000 and 2008.
However, liberals and the liberal-minded radical opposition already knew how to reply (and take comfort in that). They began arguing that the "peace enforcement" and political reforms occurred before the global crisis, which, they argue, abolished all and any continuity. Therefore, in their opinion, it is necessary to conclude a "Moncloa Pact" with the street opposition, call States-General, and renege on the tandem. Generally speaking, it is high time "to renegotiate the social contract". The short-minded Russians in 2000, they say, sold "real" democracy for sausage and now that this sausage is becoming scarce it is time to get the democracy back. They know that Medvedev will do nothing of the sort and this is "bad"- though theoretically he could - hence the talk of "chances".
Medvedev is still being urged to destroy the structure he has been building as one of Mr Putin's closest associates and is continuing to do so as head of state. They recommend that he abandon plans to develop an innovations-based economy, fight corruption, and renew personnel. What Strategy-2020, what mobilisation, what anti-crisis programmes? they ask. These "no longer count". The problem is the regime, which needs to be scrapped as soon as possible. Set the ball rolling, Mr Medvedev, and we will join you. Or it will collapse under its own weight, "helped by the crisis".
In May, the country will mark the first anniversary of the inauguration. I think by that time "social contract" devotees who want to trade sausage for democracy will have shed their illusions utterly and finally. Mr Medvedev is not "their" President. He is the President of Russia.
Vitaly Ivanov
