The bear's programme remains a selection of borrowed symbols
The economic crisis broke a cycle of creating ideological doctrines offered to the public through the country's main political party. It can be acknowledged that the attempt to unite society behind United Russia's programmes did not come to pass. Incidentally the idea of joining forces is more appropriate today than ever before, and only consolidation can alter the negative trends in the social-political sphere. By the summer the public will feel the full burden of change in their daily lives. However our politicians are not hurrying to offer new unifying ideals.
The country has changed so much in the last few months; since last autumn it is unrecognisable. As always during times of change, previous ideological dogmas, built for a time of growth and prosperity, seem particularly anachronistic. This is possibly because these formulas lack ideology. It was jettisoned to make way for promises of economic achievements, which turned out to be unfulfilled.
The United Russia website still displays its pre-election manifesto, which was created on the basis of the "Putin plan". Today this text reads like a litany of unachieved dreams. It turns out that in 2007 Russia had a party project called "decent work" to improve working conditions and pay, and to solve employment problems. "By 2008," the manifesto promised "the minimum wage in Russia will meet the cost of living. Public sector salaries will grow rapidly. The compensation for scientists, teachers, doctors, and cultural workers will provide a comfortable lifestyle. Our party is the first political party to make pension reform a priority: total pension contributions must yield a pension of no less than 40% of a given wage... pensions will double over the next two years... people with limited abilities will find a new standard of living and have work options, and be able to adapt socially."
And, finally, its apotheosis: "As a result of significantly increased pensions and wages, inflation will fall (in 2011 to 5%) and once and for all Russia will no longer be a country of poor people."
According to data from Medialogia, the term "Putin plan" was most used in the media during the summer of 2007, peaking in September. A decline was seen in October and November, and in January 2008 the once-popular slogan was dropped. After the election, it no longer seemed of any use. Before, people had actually been able to work out what it meant. But did anyone want to work out what it meant? People did not vote for the party programme, they voted for a man who they believed had some kind of "plan."
The party, understanding the ideological weakness of such a programme, immersed itself in finding a new popular slogan. However, they looked for it in much the same place they found the last one. And that's why at the beginning of 2008 the "Putin plan" became "Strategy 2020."
United Russia followed the same course. It decided to rewrite its manifesto in accordance with the Government's economic plans, irrespective of the logic of formulating such a long-term strategy (given that it will be impossible to verify the path chosen by today's bureaucrats in 12 years). We can note that United Russia is once again ready to tie the party line to current economic policy.
The presentation of the Strategy at February's presidium meeting of the State Council seemed to indicate it had a long and happy political life ahead. And the party grabbed hold of the Strategy as if it were a life raft. A new programme, containing new promises was prepared for November's United Russia conference.
There was a straightforward exchange of sources: it is clear from the statistics that since last January Strategy-2020 has found record popularity. Unfortunately the crisis broke and negated all the party's efforts.
Work in re-writing the main documents was completed. And the phrase itself, judging from how much it was used, has lost its relevance. From time to time United Russia still convenes their Forum 2020; however at their most recent meeting, they needed a special, unusually public speech by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Executive Office, Vladislav Surkov, to remind them that these plans existed. True, this was not with a view to promoting the party, but battling with the crisis.
Today members of United Russia have forgotten the calls they made in the summer for the creation of a new manifesto, and have ended up without one.
The activity of three discussion forums, three United Russia clubs: the social-conservative, the liberal "4th November", and the government-patriotic, are all sporadic and dispensable. Four years after the attempt to try its wings, the party once again has complete agreement in its ranks. It is therefore no accident that the left and the liberals have for a long time been gathering at their own joint meetings. The patriotic club is strengthening its position thanks to its contact with the Russian Orthodox Church, puts on propaganda shows in monasteries and uses the Bible to enliven party politics.
Today, United Russia, however strange it sounds, has no politics of its own. Everything that this party offers the electorate is borrowed from the Government or from the Church. This would be considered normal if there was political competition. But without competition the party of power is losing its backbone. Today its popularity rating equals that of the Prime Minister, who in popular public perception is still the country's leader. However, voices of discontent are already being heard on the fringes of United Russia's empire, and these are no human rights activists but relatively high-ranking leaders.
The case of the Murmansk Governor, who can expect to be strictly penalised by the party for his criticism of the Mayor and party colleagues in a speech, is precedent-setting. The weakened position of the party of power has still not become apparent in its ratings, but the Governor's senses can predict better than any sociologist the possible swift decline in popularity of United Russia as the crisis deepens.
In these conditions, the leadership of United Russia will take the strictest measures possible, thus indicating their fatal misreading of the circumstances. Instead of starting a dialogue with the public, it will use the language of repression and accusations of "divergence". Unity in the ranks increases the popularity of a structure. It could come to pass that United Russia's misguided instincts for self preservation could disarm it at a very dangerous moment. The superhuman strength that the party is today exerting to depose its "scapegoats" could be used much more constructively, if, of course, they don't miss their opportunity, the moment when it's still possible to forge an agreement with the public.
For that to happen, the party has to become a public party.
Incidentally, the action taken by United Russia today is entirely limited to supporting Government action, which rankles with a public who have seen a dramatic increase in their domestic bills. None of them have read the United Russia manifesto, the full list of unfulfilled promises, although it would be a mistake to assume that Russians are as indifferent as that to the real change in the thickness of their wallets.
United Russia clearly doesn't want to take on the goal of having a free and frank conversation with members of the public, and is becoming an ever more closed structure. That does not bode well for the image of its Prime Minister, its leader. Establishing public United Russia reception offices nationwide, which were renamed Vladimir Putin reception offices back in its heyday, have been gathering complaints, the majority of which remain unresolved. But the result is that it's not the party that is reneging on its promises, but Mr Putin personally.
Against this background, the President's initiative to involve the population through TV interviews looks promising. Dmitry Medvedev is trying to succeed where United Russia has failed. And if he succeeds in calming the passions, to calm the country with the openness of this style of address, then he'll have brought the powerful political infrastructure behind himself, especially it's most important function: interaction with the electorate.
True, an aptly spoken word can change people's minds. For example, it can remind them of their own responsibility for developments such as political apathy, a flippant attitude towards credit, dependency, tolerance of extremism, and indifference to the victims of high profile political murders. It is true that this kind of discussion would require a high level of freedom of speech in the country.
The data in this article were presented by Medialogia especially for Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
By Alexandra Samarina