What caused the current global crisis and how has it affected Russia? How can we survive it? Can we come through the crisis changed, with a reinvigorated and dynamic economy? How can we guarantee the system's stability, the conditions and framework of our path out of the crisis? I am grateful to the newspaper Izvestia for the discussion of the crisis and means of overcoming it, which is what has prompted me to write about these ten theses.
But let's start with a preliminary observation addressed to Mikhail Yuryev, who started this discussion, but not to him alone. In any crisis the standard of living deteriorates. Sometimes, very dramatically, and this prompts people to support mass mobilisation programmes like those offered by the Nazi party at the end of the 1920's. But no such programme has ever brought long-lasting sustainable development. That is anchored in the interests of national economy, in the national model of democracy and on the broad dialogue with political forces, without which, all this mobilising impulse manages to do is fritter away social health and wealth.
1. The western origin of Russia's financial and economic crisis. First of all this crisis model was created by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at the end of the 1970s: supply side economics, the night-watchman state, the removal of limits on financial speculation, the extreme concentration of capital, a tax system that's unfair on the majority; this is the crisis of dogmatic monetarism.
It is also, according to Alan Greenspan, a crisis of the mortgage boom: Americans compensated for the acute underdevelopment of monetary models in their social sphere (above all, the low incomes among the lower and middle classes) by taking out loans. And in the end, multi-layer derivatives brought the American financial system - and that of the entire world - crashing down.
2. The cyclical development of the world economy. No one has countermanded the cycle of growth-recession-depression described by Marx in Das Kapital. In the longer term the Kondratiev wave also entered its lowest phase. Sustainable growth lasted quite a long time: attracting new markets to the global economy (above all the eastern bloc in late 1980s) has played it's role; local crises (the Asian crisis of 1997, and the Russian crisis of 1998) took the strain off the global economy; plus the new economic bubble in the United States. But the crisis had to come, and come it did.
3. The crisis as an opportunity. Recession is simply a stage of any cycle. During a crisis people don't just queue at the soup kitchen, because they have no other option, like in New York in 1931. Expenditure is optimised as are business structures; innovative solutions are sought and found. 1998, in spite of all its difficulties, was a year of not-entirely missed opportunities. "Opportunity 2009" also should not be missed.
4. "Null inheritance" must be retained. Perhaps in order to come through the crisis, to move forward, we need to throw these "null inheritances" over the side of the modernity ship? Maintaining order, concentrating resources, and refocusing on development: This trinity, part of the Putin Plan, should remain unchanged, and similarly there should be no change in how the politics it stands for is seen. The third phase, development, must be implemented once the crisis is over.
5. We need a perspective. The Russian mentality is harsh: sink or swim, all or nothing. That's why the country so needs perspective. We should not live with the exchange rate fluctuations: it is not just pointless, but also, in the end, vulgar. Strategy 2020 is a real policy that should be implemented. Corrections are of course possible, but denying the future is not. Energy efficiency is another important and highly pragmatic task that President Medvedev has set, in order to achieve relative competitiveness the national economy needs to decrease the energy consumption of its GDP by 40% by 2020.
6. Modernisation of the country is vital. Economic modernisation is the gradual shift of the extended commodity model towards innovation. Political modernisation is President Medvedev's participatory democracy, which means gradually widening the involvement of political forces and citizens in the political process. Social modernisation means turning the middle classes into the majority of the population. The need to increase the proportion of the country's middle class to 50-60% by 2020 should not be taken off the national agenda (the national definition of the middle class is something I have written about in "Izvestia).
7. Political stability as a precondition for modernisation. The economic crisis, although a focal point for social, economic, and political discontent, is not able to shake the stability of political systems. Stabilising factors include the consolidation of power and high social trust in President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and United Russia. It is also crucial to be aware the financial safety cushion is available and that it works. These are not factors that can be depleted all at once, but will continue for a long time to come.
8. The political battle will be won by the person who can really address the public's concerns. Those chanting, in an entirely unfocussed way, "down with...", will not be successful judging from current sociological surveys,. Real people need a real answer to their real needs. Is the opposition ready and able to provide that answer? Not long ago the information and analysis secretary of the KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) Central Committee, Sergei Obukhov, in a discussion with me on Radio Svoboda, said that the party had so far not found the key to the middle classes and small businesses. That answer is the answer to the demands of those citizens who have really been hit by this crisis. It is indicative that to all intents and purposes it doesn't exist.
9. United Russia is the main force in counter-crisis mobilisation. Above all the party is a unique feedback system and a barometer for the prevailing attitude in society: The opposition has no such networks. The raft of anti-crisis laws passed by the Duma and the corresponding decisions taken on regional levels is the clear substantial core of the anti-crisis mobilisation, even more so since the opposition has not suggested any complex and detailed alternatives. The party already works with various groups in the population who have been affected by the crisis, from office workers to deceived investors. So the political initiative to overcome the crisis is on the side of the government.
10. The dominant type of political system is retained. Attracting political minorities to this process does not mean that United Russia will cease to dominate the political process. Of course, this dominance must be fought for, using political methods. Social support for the party is strong, but the worsening crisis situation means political competition must itself become more competitive.
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The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of Izvestia editors.
Dmitry Orlov