The economic crisis and the gas war with Ukraine overshadowed some notable shifts that have been happening in the relations between Russia and the West in recent weeks. Russia, for the first time recently, took real steps to normalise the relations: It resumed dialogue with NATO and announced that it would not deploy its Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad Region.


The economic crisis and the gas war with Ukraine overshadowed some notable shifts that have been happening in the relations between Russia and the West in recent weeks. Russia, for the first time recently, took real steps to normalise the relations: It resumed dialogue with NATO and announced that it would not deploy its Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad Region.
Granted, the dialogue with NATO has been resumed only on a symbolic level and nobody had really intended to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. However, a toning down of the aggressive anti-Western rhetoric and concrete steps to normalise relations with Russia's natural allies, the United States and Europe, cannot be denied. The easiest explanation would be to attribute it to the hopes pinned on the new policy of President Obama. However, even a cursory look at the alignment of forces in American politics, which holds no promise of an early breakthrough in the relations with Russia, and Vladimir Putin's own unfortunate experience of making unilateral concessions to America (in his time Putin agreed to allow American military bases in Central Asia without asking for anything in return, only to feel resentful when no reciprocal concessions were forthcoming) give few grounds for expecting concrete results from the new US administration.
Perhaps we are witnessing something more serious: Early signs of a change of direction in Russian foreign policy.
Against the background of worsening internal problems due to the economic crisis, which make battling on two fronts extremely difficult, Vladimir Putin would stand to gain from normalised relations with the West. The grim prospects for the Russian economy outlined recently by the Government and the Central Bank at the State Duma leave no doubt that the authorities are girding themselves to confront unprecedented challenges, and diverting resources to a new mini-Cold War is not a prospect they relish.
In addition, social and economic problems will inevitably raise the issue of the survival of the Putin regime, and Putin could use the image of a Russian "general Musharraf", an authoritarian but predictable ruler and "an ally in the fight against terror". Many Western leaders preoccupied with their own crisis problems would readily turn a blind eye to the differences with Russia and sign a strategic truce forgetting about democracy in Russia and, for example, allowing Moscow to preserve its influence in the CIS.
It would be hard for Russia to regain the West's sympathy, and Putin's recent actions - the conflict with Ukraine and his arrogant behaviour in Davos do not help because they are seen as reminders of the Russian leadership's lingering neo-imperial habits. But steps towards dismantling an anti-Western foreign policy are welcome. Thanks to the crisis Russian politics may become a little less ham-handed.
The Author is a Russian politician

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Vladimir Putin would stand to gain from a normalisation of relations with the West against the background of growing domestic problems caused by the economic crisis

Vladimir Milov