Nikolai Petrov
In my view, the discussion has been lively and productive. My first impression is that a political crisis is inevitable. It will not come from the opposition, but follow a managerial crisis brought on by the financial and economic crisis as it expands. Nothing is being done to prevent a managerial and especially a political crisis: the authorities are inadequate here. In the political field, they continue to exercise "total control", even though this policy is counter-productive today.
Take, for example, governors. Appointing an outside person to a depressive region may solve some political problem (for example, removing a politician from the federal scene) but the move is likely to be explosive. Here it does not matter if the explosion rocks the Kirov or Moscow Region; a local detonation can easily develop into a political crisis and no one will know how to get out of it because the physics is different. It is an explosion, not a mere flame, and there is no tool to scatter the energy - at least, none that we have.
Or take the political parties. If the blast is inevitable, it must be directed along some organised lines. The authorities must be interested in this above all. But what are they doing? They are closing down loyal opposition structures and throwing professional politicians out on the street.
There is also no communication between society and the political parties. The days when a party's loyalty to the Kremlin was seen as a mark of distinction are gone. Now the Kremlin itself needs independent parties looking after the interests of social sections and groups, but it does not seem to be aware of that need.
Public competition serves not only to select but also to share responsibility. If people vote for an administration, they also share responsibility for its actions. An administration can at least talk to the people - but then again, whom are we urging to open dialogue with society? A President who as a public politician was not known to anyone a year ago and whose popularity depends on the rouble exchange rate and Putin's standing? Governors who are little known to political elites in many regions and are justly seen as federal overseers rather than as their leaders?
A paradoxical situation arises. The advice we are giving might have been useful a year ago, but now, in a time of crisis, when the pace of events is quickening, it is useless. Our system of decision-making is modelled on Brownian movement. There is a President who is pushed in different directions by different forces; and when the political current is not turbulent and time drags, he barely moves, despite experiencing ten different forces applied to him. If you look at this speck under a microscope, you will see that the very first impulse removes it from the field of vision. About the same will take place now. The time is so compressed that any thrust from some person or group or clan is enough to jolt the entire system out of whack.
The economic crisis has increased the likelihood and price of managerial mistakes. At the top, the federal elites no longer have a pie to divide among all takers. It is dwindling and is therefore a much-sought after prize. Furthermore, it is sought not only by elitist groups around Medvedev and Putin, but also sought by dozens of other clans that have made promises, are dividing resources, and will fight any attempts to deprive them of their piece of the pie.
The grassroots situation offers equal potential. Yevgeny Gontmakher's Novocherkassk model, which has been mentioned, is very real. Common bank and company bankruptcies across the country need not look frightening, but bankruptcies will also hit companies that are the mainstays of entire towns - of which there are plenty in this country. Even if the President and Prime Minister produce the money without delay, there is no time to solve all the problems at once: there will be a waiting period before money reaches the end user and becomes available to purchase and transport fuel, etc. These are all basic matters for survival. Otherwise, the town concerned will have to be evacuated elsewhere in wintertime, or will suffer a local explosion developing into something worse ... The political crisis is likely to result from this type of explosion, an explosion of desperation, not the one generated by the opposition.
Now about the local specifics of the political crisis. We at Carnegie, inspired by the Soros Institute, launched a similar project a few months ago. Our conclusion is that the crisis hits the most advanced regions and capitals the hardest, but they are also the first to recover. On the other hand, regions that stand alone do not suffer badly, but have no upward mobility afterwards.
The main thing, I think, is the relationship between the centre and the regions. Unlike some of my counterparts, I believe the centre will lose some of its clout. In fact, this is already happening. We are witnessing signals coming from experienced and knowledgeable regional leaders. Unlike Yevgeny Minchenko, I do not think the crisis will change elites. On the contrary, the plan to remove Luzhkov and Shaimiyev will not work now, because to risk destabilisation in a large region for unknown reasons makes no sense.
It is not that the centre will offer to surrender some of its resources to the regions; the centre's resources are diminishing rapidly as it is. While earlier poor management was compensated for by readily available money, now the trick will not work. The question is, who will be the first to get the axe? Will it be Dagestan? Or Chechnya? Or Kabardino-Balkaria? It is not necessary for it to start in this country. An explosion may take place anywhere in the Caucasus and later spread to us.
The crisis will not only weaken the centre but will also lead to a phase like the one we experienced under Boris Yeltsin. The weakening of the centre will increase regional separatism. With no money to buy loyalty, there will be no loyalty, but instead greater independence. Nor will there be money to keep the country together where the bonds are loose; Putin, for example, has proposed that an extra 70,000 roubles be paid per car for transporting cars from European Russia to Russia's Far East. Earlier, the Government promised to subsidise air fares for Far Eastern residents, but money is unlikely to be available.
The third aspect concerns the effects of the crisis on regional and federal politicians, elites, parties, and movements. I agree with Yevgeny Minchenko that the crisis is offering the country a unique chance, and it is good that it has happened now, not later. Whether or not we can make use of it is another matter. With an absence of strong institutions, the crisis will turn our poorly structured political elites into a mush, and after the crisis we will see an entirely different playing field. Politically, the stage will undergo a total transformation, and new and challenging players will make their appearance.
The crisis will end state paternalism towards individuals and the regions. We will see the rise of a class of taxpayers and a sense of tax-paying. Earlier, all taxes came from oil wells, not citizens, and supported the state. The Government was generous in giving out this money to citizens, businesses, and some others. It would have been strange if in that situation citizens would have controlled the Government as in other countries where the government subsists on public taxes.
Changes like this will also take place in the relationship between the centre and the regions. The country will become less centralised, less unitary, and more federal. It is a pity, however, that in such a situation the Government traditionally acts as a troubleshooter. It has never had a strategy and there is little reason to expect one now, with problems and commitments weighing heavily on it. Nonetheless, hope persists because the state is still able to help 10 to 20 large corporations and banks, not tens of thousands of small and mid-sized businesses, which is the concern of the regions. Handing down powers and funds to the regions is not a matter of wishing or not wishing, it is an inevitability. The question is whether or not this inevitability will be understood by those who handle the issue.
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When there is no money to buy loyalty, independence comes