The structure of supreme power in modern Russia can be described as a "tandem," a term the Kremlin likes more than "diarchy." So far, both leaders have been satisfied with their interaction.
Western analysts wonder which of the two leaders holds the real power and whether Medvedev will push Putin aside, or if Putin will reclaim power. They are smart but naïve people. They don't understand that Medvedev and Putin think alike. Medvedev's views of development and its goals differed less from that of Putin than the views of any other presidential candidate. This is why he was elected president, with his own specific understanding of the world and its values, and sometimes ways to change it.
Putin has remained Russia's most experienced real politician, with a colossal influence on the federal, regional and law enforcement elites. Part of his influence has contributed to the incumbent president's ratings.
Medvedev's term began with a war and a dramatic financial crisis. It is difficult to remain a liberal in this situation, when too many decisions made to ensure survival are taken from the experience of etatists (advocates of state socialism). Power is always consolidated and centralised at the time of crisis.
Medvedev is president of a country in the throes of a crisis, with a visibly worsening social mood and growing public dissatisfaction at the yoke of bureaucrats and monopolies, and the ineffectiveness of the state. He is trapped.
But Putin will not have it easy either. The posts he has chosen - prime minister and head of the ruling party - are good when the situation is good. We have had unlikely men as prime ministers - Fradkov and Zubkov - who were nevertheless quite successful.
But the crisis has placed Putin in the frying pan because he holds posts that are most closely associated with social and economic problems. Few politicians emerge from a crisis with an increased rating, and so Putin is bound to get his share of public disappointment.
What is different is that the President cannot criticise the Prime Minister, the Government, or the ministers. The State Duma can no longer criticise the cabinet because it is chaired by the head of the parliament's ruling party.
This is an unusual and most likely wrong path for a country where the executive powers traditionally play an excessive role in the life of the people. The Government and the ministers are often wrong, and criticising them is a natural way to let off steam for the head of state and members of parliament.
We remember how the parliament criticised Zurabov, Gref and Kudrin, pleasing the people. And we remember how the President's rating grew when he snarled at the ministers.
The extension of the presidential term to six years is the most tangible innovation of the tandem, guaranteeing at least 10 years in power for each of the two men. And yet, it is unlikely that the Constitution has been amended to suit Putin. Or rather, it has not been amended to ensure his election as President. Simply, Putin doesn't like being a lame duck.
The possibility that he will again become President has had a positive effect on the Russian elite, who wants to know on whom to place its stakes, and to have one leader with one administration, and one centre of influence.
However, we now have two leaders with two administrations, and several centres of influence. This is a positive factor for the country, because competition between the two administrations gives more freedom to everyone, and sometimes even encourages the approval of better decisions.
But this positive situation has been affected by a heavy financial crisis, which is difficult to understand and which has taken different forms. The search for ways to overcome it may stir conflicts in the tandem. Who gets the money and privileges, and how many? How rational are these expenditures? These are the key questions, because someone will have to answer for the multibillion losses of the anti-crisis budget - we know for sure that a huge part of the money will be squandered.
The tandem's consolidating feature is unwillingness to speak with the people without resorting to populist slogans. Why promise to keep up real incomes, wages and pensions when we know that they were ensured by high oil, gas and metal prices, which have now nosedived? Could we have reached higher social standards without a serious material background? Of course, not. And the loss of that support is bound to undermine the foundations of social welfare.
The people are ready to hear the truth; they don't want to be lied to, because lies create moral reasons for discontent and protest. If they are warned about the problems, they will still be dissatisfied with the situation but will have no moral reasons for protest.
Medvedev is a fast learner. He is forming a team of talented and relatively young people who mistrust state monopolies and corporations as the main development agents. And our Constitution is pro-presidential, so you need not worry about Medvedev. He will survive.
But then, Putin has nothing to fear either - nobody will push him aside, unless he himself decides to move aside, giving his charges a chance to fight the crisis and its consequences 24 hours a day seven days a week. Because those who will not lose their jobs in 2009 will work day and night to survive.