Mikhail Rostovsky
Governance should be flexible-or it collapses.
Like Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, Russian leaders were cornered as public unrest, stirred by skyrocketing car import duties, swept Vladivostok. Russia experienced something similar in 1993, when Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin capitulated unconditionally. Vladimir Putin, the present Prime Minister, would never do that-concessions are not part of his political philosophy. Besides, the unrest in the Far East is only the tip of an iceberg. Are Russian leaders ready to face mass protest, which is inevitable in the midst of an economic crisis? And why do they provoke public protest even when it can be prevented?
"The Government will stand firm on car import duties," a high secret services officer in retirement told me. "It is not so much the matter of a lobby interested in higher import duties, even though there are bigwigs involved-Sergei Chemezov, CEO of the Rostekhnologii state corporation and Putin's friend, and other St Petersburg power-players who have made a kind of Russian Detroit of the city. The reason is that Putin never retreats-he thinks concessions mean weakness."
We would thus not be misled by vague Kremlin response to the Vladivostok events. As far as Moskovsky Komsomolets knows, the Government is feverishly looking for a way out of a controversial situation. There are Far Eastern protesters to appease and a reputation to uphold without "succumbing to extremist threats". Driven to the end of their tether, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and other high officials are keeping in close contact with Primorye Territory Governor Sergei Darkin, despite the fact that he is in Moscow's black book.
The Government has driven itself into a deadlock. Can it get out? Informed people say car part import duties might be cut dramatically, while others shrug their shoulders. Some say Russian rulers will have to change ways-as a prominent member of one of the former Cabinets, who said: "The illusion of omnipotence has outlived itself." Then again, car imports, however essential they might be, are only a small part of a huge and troubling mosaic.
The crisis will be long and painful. The Russian elite realises it. As he was recently addressing a select audience, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said that 2009 would be a disastrous year. If the economic fall slows in 2010, it will be taken as a symptom of convalescence, he remarked. High officials sound even more pessimistic in private conversations. They whisper to each other that the "safety belt" the Government takes pride in will become a useless rope as early as next summer or autumn unless expenditures shrink.
Rouble rate forecasts are no less apocalyptic. The most optimistic ones say it will be RR35/$1 by the middle of next year. It is true that no one can predict the rates of the world's leading currencies against each other, either.
In this situation, the Government should refrain from making unnecessary steps that might build up social tensions. Meanwhile, it is doing just the contrary. The Defence Ministry, for one, intends to dismiss thousands of embittered and trigger-happy officers at the peak of the crisis. Car import duties are another pitiful example. Is there no one clever enough in the Government to see how hard the rise is hitting the Russian Far East?
If you reply, "There really are none," you have little respect for the Government and even less for yourself. The Government has no less intellect than the average person on the street. The crux of the matter lies elsewhere-essential decision-making is overly concentrated in the Prime Minister's office. Such concentration rules out a comprehensive approach taking into account all the details. This was dangerous even before the crisis and at its onset. Last autumn's social reform moves were made in a hurry by a narrow circle and drastically increased the pressure on private enterprise just when it would have been wise to ease that pressure. Now, privatised decision-making is disastrous.
We cannot say that the top shrugs off social tensions during the crisis. As we know from reliable sources, top Kremlin ideologists are calling for Putin to step down from his prime-ministerial post with a plausible excuse and concentrate on leading the United Russia party, while the Government might have a sufficient number of "one-shot Prime Ministers" to replace each other at every turn of the crisis.
As expected, Putin immediately saw that the resignation proposal boiled down to slow and agonising political suicide. The present situation certainly demands him staying at the Government helm. But is he ready to stop keeping up his amazing public rating at all cost? And if he clings to it, what will be done to maintain his popularity?
One thing is clear-making short shrift of dissenters is possible only when they are in short supply. Otherwise, they take the law into their own hands and make short shrift of their rulers. Russian history abounds with such instances.
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DISSIDENTS' CAR RACE
The Russian Far East, Siberia and the trans-Baikal region are in a fever, and not surprisingly-almost a half of their population make their living on car sales, maintenance and repairs. Large and small businesses mainly revolve around right-hand drive models. It is hard to say whether or not their protests will spread nationwide.
The Internet is brimming with calls for a big protest action on December 21, mainly coming from the Russian Far East. Occasional initiatives came from Moscow driving clubs but did not evoke public enthusiasm. At first, there were plans for a circular protest race along Moscow's Garden Ring, but they were halted due to lack of interest. Things are similar in regions around Moscow. The controversial Government decision has not yet hit Central Russian car dealers and owners, though prices for all cars, new and second-hand, will snowball quite soon. Sales will drop disastrously with the combination of high prices and crisis conditions.
(Alexander ROSTARCHUK, MKmobile deputy editor-in-chief)