Over the eight years of Vladimir Putin's first and second presidential terms, we were able to observe a moving consolidation of the elites at all levels and a virtual lack of conflicts between the regional and federal levels. Much of the credit for this must go to the fairly high authority commanded by the federal administration and Putin personally. Regional leaders realized that it was not in their favor to thumb their noses at the authorities, as they had sometimes done during Boris Yeltsin's presidency.


The blame game may open up old wounds at the regional level

Over the eight years of Vladimir Putin's first and second presidential terms, we were able to observe a moving consolidation of the elites at all levels and a virtual lack of conflicts between the regional and federal levels. Much of the credit for this must go to the fairly high authority commanded by the federal administration and Putin personally. Regional leaders realized that it was not in their favor to thumb their noses at the authorities, as they had sometimes done during Boris Yeltsin's presidency. Other reasons were the favourable economic situation and the obvious improvement of people's living standards in practically all the regions, which enabled the local authorities to report successes achieved through coordinated work of administrations at all levels. As a result, there was no cause for conflict. Finally, Putin's team mounted a fairly robust and concerted effort to build a vertical power structure, crowned with the introduction of appointed, rather than elected, governors. This structure ensured that there could be no conflicts between the federal and regional authorities during his presidency, at least in principle.

At the same time, conflicts between regional leaders and the mayors of mainly regional centers were common. Differences intensified after the governors came to be appointed while most of the mayors were still elected. In the first eight years of this millennium, the main conflicts in which the parties involved put the blame for various negative phenomena on each other occurred at that level. The mayor would say that the governor hindered him and the governor in turn accused the mayor of not working hard enough. In some places such situations were resolved in an ingenious way - for example, by introducing City Managers, which meant that such a figure as the elected mayor was practically removed and the powers to elect him were devolved to the deputies of local government body. . In some places the conflict had a more dramatic outcome. In one instance, criminal charges were brought against the mayor, which automatically removed him from his job. This method had been tried out in several regions, but basically, those were still local conflicts. The situation changed after Dmitry Medvedev came to power. Again, the change can be attributed to several factors. Number one: the regional elites were somewhat disoriented in spite of the assurances that the Medvedev-Putin tandem was working well in running the state.

Who was calling the shots, the President or the Prime Minister? This was further complicated by the fact that most regional governors were also included in the United Russia party vertical structure. A further element of uncertainty was added by the odd situation when the President stays out of any party while the Prime Minister becomes the governing party's leader. Some of the heavyweight regional governors who had held their jobs since before Yeltsin were increasingly tempted to try and get some mileage out of the possible contradictions.

However, their hopes were vain. In reality, the Putin-Medvedev tandem is running fairly smoothly and there seems to be no evidence of conflict. Instead there is a clear division of powers and spheres of responsibility. As part of the division of areas of responsibility, we have recently seen an emerging premiership-party vertical structure of governing the regional elites.

It includes a whole series of measures, both administrative and legislative. A regional bloc has been set up in the government under the supervision of Vice Premier Sergei Sobyanin, a very able administrator, who is aided by Victor Basargin, his former colleague at the office of the Urals Presidential Representative and current Minister of Regional Development. Some legislation has been passed that makes it mandatory for governors to report to the government. The other component is the innovations related to party structures. Candidates for governor are now to be nominated by the party that won the election, and the winner in the elections of most regional legislatures is United Russia, headed by Vladimir Putin. Another novelty is that the deputies of local self-government bodies will be able to take a no-confidence vote in the mayor and force his resignation. An additional system of checks and balances is being created with regard to the regional governors and city mayors. The President's Address and the Prime Minister's major speech to the Congress of United Russia should be seen as parts of a single whole. The measures proposed by the President in his address regarding the organization of regional power in general strengthen the government's clout.

The Prime Minister has proposed a series of economic measures and made it clear that although the federal budget would help the regions and municipalities, it would closely watch how the money is used. Putin is sending a clear signal that everyone, and not just the federal powers, will share the responsibility. That includes parties, and not only United Russia, but all the other parties.

The question of responsibility takes on added relevance in the context of the crisis. The Prime Minister has proposed some revolutionary measures, especially in the taxation sphere, which have met with a mixed reaction in the regions. For example, the profit tax was previously paid in advance at the beginning of a quarter. Now, the Prime Minister has proposed that it be paid based on real profit, which obviously cannot be as high now as it used to be. On the other hand, it gives less leeway to the regional authorities, since the profit tax is one of the main sources of revenue for local budgets today.

Another revolutionary proposal made by the Prime Minister would allow the regions to issue local laws to cut taxes on small businesses that operate on a simplified taxation system. Obviously, many of our regional elites are reluctant to change their ways to meet the new crisis conditions, as they had grown accustomed to living in conditions of abundance and are psychologically unprepared for living and working according to new economic rules. Somewhat oddly, but regional budgets have plans to increase their social obligations. Populism is of course very convenient, but not when the country is in crisis. Either way, the money to meet social obligations must be found. This raises the question as to who will be responsible for job cuts, lower tax revenues, and wage arrears in the public sector, all of which are very much in the cards.

Even if economic problems continue to worsen, I do not foresee attempts by either the President or the Prime Minister to shift the blame onto the other. Both Medvedev and Putin are well aware that they are in the same boat and that any conflicts at the federal level may threaten the very survival of the country. Competition is likely to be at a lower level, between the regional leaders and the heads of local governments. .

Methods of playing the blame game are already being perfected. Some regions, for instance, have decided to use our methodology of "survivability rankings" for this purpose. The International Political Expertise Institute has published three such rankings, which have proven to be highly authentic. Now, that methodology is being put to other uses. Ulyanovsk Governor Sergei Morozov, for one, has suggested setting up survivability ratings for the heads of local governments , and in Buryatia, they are already making survivability ratings of regional administration officials.

Contradictions between the federal center and the regions may reappear in the crisis conditions. The first hints that governors are reverting to the ways of the Fatherland-All Russia times can already be discerned in the remarks of some regional heavyweights regarding a return to elected governors. We may see a powerful groundswell of regional patriotism, such as during the times of Eduard Rossel's "Urals Republic". The regions may begin comparing their contributions to the federal budget and wondering why the net contributors to the federal budget should feed the subsidized regions. I think such claims will inevitably appear, but the federal authorities must quash them to avoid separatism.

Yevgeny Minchenko