Putin to the Kremlin or the crisis to the population?
At first glance, nothing unexpected has happened. Back in the summer of 2007, I suggested in Novaya Gazeta that after the end of his second term as President, Vladimir Putin would move to the Prime Minister's seat, keeping his grip on government and appointing a stand-in who would not possess full powers but would "keep the seat warm" until he became President again. One of his missions would be to adopt constitutional amendments to extend the presidential term while he himself would probably stay in power for no more than two years.
Hence, there is nothing surprising about the amendment to extend the presidential term. Come to think of it, it would make sense to hold elections once every four years if they led to a real transfer of power. However, if the only aim of elections is to legitimize the self-same leader, one cannot help thinking that it could be done less often. Anyway, it looks more like a regular washday in the army than elections. A political sauna day. Doing it once every six or seven years would be just right.
The novelty is not in the amendment. Today the question at the focus of the constitutional crisis is not "what we change" but "how". On November 5, President Dmitry Medvedev delivered an address announcing the six-year term. On the evening of November 11, the amendments were officially introduced in the Duma. Although the deputies had not seen the amendments, the Constitutional Committee approved them on the morning of November 12. The whole procedure took no more than 20 minutes. On November 14, the deputies voted for the first reading of the amendment to the country's Main Law, and on Friday, November 21, the third reading of the amendments will be adopted. Meanwhile, instructions are being sent to the regions containing the deadlines and explaining the form in which amendments should be endorsed by the regional assemblies. Significantly, in the nine days that it took the deputies to adopt the constitutional amendments, not a single opinion poll was conducted to demonstrate how the population - incidentally, sovereignty lies with the people under the Constitution - feels about the amendments. Nobody even considered such a trifle.
The reason why a measured constitutional tango in the "stand-in" scenario turned into a breakneck gallop is on the surface. The Russian leadership has finally "caught up" with the crisis. Over the previous month and a half, the leadership clearly was not abreast of the developments. In September it intended to restore the stock market and dreamed of making Russia a "safe haven"; throughout October it promised to give everyone money for everything, hoping to keep up demand and investments, and promised enthusiastically to keep the rouble strong. It was only by the beginning of November, when Russian reserves (which only recently seemed to be as huge as the Himalayas) shrank by 13% within a month and oil price dropped to $50, that a sobering moment arrived. To put it crudely, at this rate and with such a price per barrel, the reserves would hardly last for three quarters. Accordingly, the political scenario whereby an energetic and firm Prime Minister rescues the economy from external upheavals by manual control goes into the wastebasket.
It was then that the decision was taken to devalue the rouble and change the Constitution. The two decisions are closely interconnected. Devaluation of the rouble means that the reserves will be rescued from at least one danger. That is the good news. Unfortunately, the Russian population will have to pay for it, and that is the bad news. In the context of devaluation in Russia, incomes and savings in dollar terms will shrink while prices will grow or at best remain the same. Almost 50% of the inventory in Russia's retail trade is imported goods that will appreciate accordingly in national currency. Meanwhile, the domestic industry, given smooth devaluation and a lack of credit resources, is unlikely to adequately replace the imports.
Unlike the 1998 default, the cat's tail will be cut off in bits. Although the cat is generally patient, after the third or fourth amputation it may begin to wonder why its tail is getting shorter while the presidential term is about to get longer, and why it is that the physician and the vet constantly switch places, handing the scalpel to each other. It looks thoroughly un-heroic.
In other words, the main political question in the short-term is, will Mr Putin get back to the Kremlin before the crisis gets to the population? This is not just about bringing the old new president back to the Kremlin. We are talking about the scrapping of a semi-voluntary pact between government, the population, and the elites that underpinned Mr Putin's political system in the context of growing wealth. The cocktail of bribery and soft reprisals inevitably changes its taste. The former ingredient is obviously in short supply, required quite a bit more of the latter to be poured into the cocktail. Changing the Prosecutor General will surely be a signal of the new era. After all, the main anti-crisis manager in Russia is the Prosecutor; at least, I think this is Mr Putin's idea.
Mr Putin should present his comeback to the Kremlin as the issue by the population of a new, effectively emergency, six-year mandate to combat the crisis. It looks as if he has several months to get such a mandate.
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"Unlike the 1998 default, the cat's tail will be cut off in bits. Although the cat is generally patient it may begin to wonder why its tail is getting shorter while the presidential term is about to get longer."
Kirill Rogov