Vitaly Ivanov, Deputy Director of the Centre of Current Political Studies in Russia
In his first Address to the Federal Assembly, President Dmitry Medvedev unveiled a range of important political initiatives. Many experts and commentators, without bothering to analyze them, hastened to proclaim a "revision of the Putin legacy". Some hail (for an umpteenth time) the start of a "thaw" or "liberalisation". Others warn of an approaching "freeze". In reality, these initiatives reveal a total continuity of policy.
It must be recalled that continuity is not the same as stagnation or conservation. It implies dynamics and innovation, improvement while adhering to some immutable principles and approaches. President Medvedev's initiatives are a case in point.
Now, in true Medvedev style, let us go over the items.
1. First, the decision to introduce amendments to the Constitution. Some are trying to contrast it with Mr Putin's consistent reluctance to revise (change) or even adjust the Main Law in any way. However, in June last year Mr Putin explained his position and publicly recognized that "spot" amendments to the Constitution were quite admissible. In his Address, Mr Medvedev spoke about "correcting" the provisions of the Main Law. No less, but no more. Once his amendments are adopted, the constitutional structure of Russian power will change, but not in any fundamental way.
2. The extension of the President's term from four to six years and the State Duma term from four to five years. Mr Putin, when he said the Constitution could be adjusted, was referring to the provision on the term of presidential powers. He saw no reason why the term could not be prolonged to 5-7 years. Four years was not enough for either the head of state or for parliament. Considering the turmoil preceding and following elections, at most three years are available for real current work. Meanwhile, the challenges facing Russian power called for maximum stability, concentration, mobilisation, a broader planning horizon, etc. In addition, even if they are not a destabilising factor, frequent elections in this country do not add to stability. Mr Medvedev has a larger prospective in mind in solving these problems.
3. The new obligation of the Government to report back to the Duma every year.
That the Constitution provides for a "weak" competence of the Russian parliament has been a standing complaint ever since its adoption. The most frequently proposed method of "strengthening" it has been direct or "gentle" transition to a parliamentary or mixed kind of republic. Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev have always declared it to be unacceptable in principle, but this does not remove the need for a measure of "strengthening". The only remaining option is to broaden the parliament's supervisory functions (its legislative powers are spelled out in the Constitution). Mr Putin set "an institutional trend" of enhancing responsibility, increasing the accountability of regional governments to the President and Government many times over. Why not enhance the Government's responsibility to parliament (the Government is already fully accountable to the President) along with increasing the terms of the President and the Duma?
4. Adjusting the procedure in which the Federation Council is formed. The need to reform the upper house of the federal parliament has long been discussed, with the main argument for it being that the current Federation Council lacks legitimacy. This may or may not be the case, but the decision has been made regardless. Mr Medvedev does not intend to introduce direct election of senators (which would have been unconstitutional) or bring the governors back to the senate. On the whole, the procedure introduced on Mr Putin's initiative in 2000 will remain in place. Senators will continue to be elected by regional parliaments and appointed by their governors, but they must be regional or local deputies, rendering meaningless the recently introduced "residence qualification," which will be canceled. The renewed Federation Council will thus have double legitimacy, so to speak.
5. The new procedure of submitting candidates for regional governors to the President will favour the parties. Since 2005, the governors have been appointed by parliaments on the President's recommendation. The candidates are selected by the presidential envoys to the Federal Districts. Though the parties that win the largest number of votes in the regional elections also have the right to submit their candidates to the President, only two party candidates have been thus presented to the President in the last three years. Brushing aside ill-considered proposals to revert to direct election, and continuing Mr Putin's move to increase the role of political parties, Mr Medvedev vests parties with the exclusive right to nominate candidates for governorship. This is a fairly progressive move that may go a long way to streamline and improve the recruitment of personnel.
6. Adjustment of the electoral and party systems for the benefit of small parties. A whole range of new rules will be introduced, including renunciation of the electoral deposit and, in the future, a possible reduction of the number of voter signatures required for a party to be allowed to participate in federal parliamentary elections and the introduction of a small quota of Duma seats for parties that have won between 5% and 7% of the vote. The 7% barrier naturally remains, but now it applies to the "big boys", as it were, while a "little boys'" barrier of 5% is introduced specifically for the small parties. The minimum size requirements for a party's membership and the number of party branches in the regions are to be gradually "phased down". In this way, viable small parties will be given better chances and will be represented in the legislature. Mr Putin has always favoured a multi-party system, and Mr Medvedev said in one of his campaign speeches that Russia had 5-7 more or less viable parties. Apparently, there is a feeling that this number should be preserved. In connection with this, the "little boys'" barrier for getting into parliament could be brought down to 3%. (Let us not forget that under current legislation, a party that wins 3% of the votes in the Duma elections is entitled to government funding).
7. Greater responsibility of the heads of municipal administrations. Mr Medvedev is going to vest municipal assemblies with the power to remove elected local chief executives. These initiatives will be the prerogative of the heads of regions; as a result, local CEOs will be more accountable not only to deputies, but to governors. It was not for nothing that the Address pointed out that "the problem has come to a head". Under Mr Putin, the vertical power structure reached down to the local level, but there was some inconsistency in determining the responsibilities of the chiefs of local administrations. Mr Medvedev will complete the building of the vertical power structure.
